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Conservation Easements and the Development of New
Energies: Fracking, Wind Turbines, and Solar
Collection
Gerald Korngold∗
INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of European settlers, there have been
competing visions for the use of American land. The traditional
ethos has been full development of resources in order to meet the
needs of a growing population and country. People differed, and
even battled at times, as to the direction and type of this
development. Two examples of this conflict are the cattle wars in
the West and disputes over the spillovers of industrial activities
into residential areas. Yet, throughout the first 200 years of the
American Republic, development of land resources in some form
was the dominant principle.
Over the past two generations, however, a new
environmentalism ethic has emerged.1 Currently this ethos is quite
pervasive, and is reflected in legislation and governmental
programs, sustainability strategies of companies, and various
Copyright 2014 by, GERALD KORNGOLD.
∗ Professor of Law, New York Law School; Visiting Fellow, Lincoln
Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, Massachusetts. I wish to thank the Property
and Environment Research Center (PERC) for a grant supporting the writing of
this Article. Of course, all errors, opinions, and assertions are mine alone.
1. The land conservation movement in the United States has roots in the
19th and early 20th centuries. John Muir founded the Sierra Club in 1892, at the
dawn of the second American century, and has grown to a membership of 1.4
million people. See Who was John Muir?, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub
.org/john_muir_exhibit/about/, archived at http://perma.cc/LMS6-NX8W (last
visited Oct. 6, 2014). The first non-governmental land trust, the Trustees of
Public Reservations, was established in 1891 dedicated to acquiring and holding
“for the benefit of the public, beautiful and historic places in Massachusetts.”
RICHARD BREWER, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA
13, 17 (2003). In 1955, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), founded in 1951 but
with roots in an organization established in 1915, began acquiring land for
conservation purposes. See Our History, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY,
http://www.nature.org/about-us/vision-mission/history/index.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/K3QR-YCSS (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). The precise origins of
the modern environmental movement cannot be pinpointed. The publication of
Rachel Carson’s The Silent Spring (1962) brought the message to a broader
segment of the public. The first Earth Day in 1970 represented the first
manifestation of environmentalism as a large-scale public movement. For a
history of environmentalism, see generally ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE
SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT (2nd ed. 2005).
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religious and belief systems. Environmentalism generally values
land in its natural state and seeks to preserve it from development.2
Conservation easements, authorized by states over the past 35
years, are a major vehicle to effectuate this new conservation
value. Conservation easements allow nonprofit organizations
(NPOs) and governmental entities to preserve land by preventing
its owner from altering its natural, environmental, and ecological
features.
Simultaneous with the widespread rise of environmentalism
and conservation easements, is an increased drive to find new
energy sources. One strain of this search operates within the
traditional model of full development of land resources and
focuses upon extraction of carbon-based fuels (oil and natural gas).
Proponents of new domestic exploration argue that domestic
exploration is necessary to meet consumer demand and to enhance
America’s geopolitical position by decreasing reliance on foreign
oil imports.3 Because of new advances over the past ten years,
exploration companies can now economically extract gas and oil
from shale formations in new areas of the United States using a
process that combines new horizontal drilling techniques with
traditional hydraulic fracturing.4 (For convenience, and consistent
with conventional usage, this Article will use the terms “fracking”
and “hydrofracking” to refer to this combination of horizontal
drilling with hydraulic fracturing technology.) Fracking increases
gas and oil development, but also raises concerns about its effect
on the environment.
A second category of new energy initiatives seeks to develop
renewable energy sources. These innovations are predicated on a
view that runs counter to the traditional full development model of
2. See RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND
(4th ed. 2001). There sometimes are competing environmental visions. See, e.g.,
Lisa W. Foderaro, As Adirondack Reserve Grows, Asking How Wild It Should
Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2013, at A27 (describing differing views of
environmentalist, recreationalists, government agencies, and others on how
forest preserve should be used).
3. See Bryan Walsh, America’s Oil Boom Won’t Make It EnergyIndependent from Middle East Madness, TIME (Sept. 5, 2013), http://science
.time.com/2013/09/05/americas-oil-boom-wont-make-it-energy-independentfrom-mideast-madness/, archived at http://perma.cc/D92R-RCCT; Patti Domm,
US Is on Fast Track to Energy Independence: Study, CNBC (Feb. 11, 2013,
2:29 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100450133, archived at http://perma.cc
/JGQ6-944R.
4. See Tomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About Fracking, 63 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 971, 971–72 (2013); Timothy Fitzgerald, Frackonomics: Some
Economics of Hydraulic Fracturing, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1337, 1338–40
(2013).
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land use and include wind turbines, solar fields, and other solar
devices. Renewable energy generation seeks to provide power
without utilizing finite earth resources (such as carbon-based
substances) or increasing the carbon footprint. Renewables also
aim to minimize their effect on the surrounding ecosystem––
although there are some minor spillovers as described below.
Overall, the development of wind and solar energy represents a
concern about the sustainability of the environment and a different
outlook than traditional full exploitation of land resources. (For
convenience this Article will refer to fracking, wind, and solar
energy collectively “new energy” or “new energies,” and to wind
and solar collectively as “renewables.”)
This Article examines the intersection of these two major
trends—the growth of conservation easements and the
development of new energies—and whether they can be
compatible under current law.5 Recent conflicts include cases
involving fracking on conservation easement land,6 differing views
among conservation organizations about drilling on easement
property,7 and community debate about siting wind turbines on
easement land.8 With the increase in both conservation easements
and new energy trends, these conflicts are likely to grow.
Specifically, this Article explores whether new energy creation can
take place on a property that is subject to a conservation easement
in light of the parties’ express agreement and argues for specific
interpretative devices that will best find the parties’ intention while
respecting public policy considerations when that intention is not
made clear in the writing. This Article also analyzes the effect of
the Internal Revenue Code on conservation easement development
and how federal deductibility has driven the structuring of
5. There are other occasions where visions over conservation easement
land have conflicted. See Gregg MacDonald, Salona Task Force Will Meet,
WASH. POST, June 9, 2001, at T16 (describing public process to determine
appropriate uses of land under governmental conservation easements,
specifically whether ballfields should be permitted or land retained in a more
natural state). William H. Whyte, Jr., an early proponent of NPO conservation
easements, raised concerns about “muted class and economic conflicts,” with
easement donors being the “gentry” with an interest in the natural countryside
not in open space with public access for parks and playgrounds. William H.
Whyte, Jr., Securing Open Space for Urban America, 36 URB. LAND INST.:
TECHNICAL BULL, 36–37, (1959).
6. See infra Part II.D.
7. See David Giller, Note, Implied Preemption And Its Effect On Local
Hydrofracking Bans in New York, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 631, 637–38 (2013).
8. See Eileen M. Adams, Residents to Decide on Town Ownership of Lots,
SUN J. Dec. 1, 2009 (reporting on town meeting to discuss rescinding town’s
conservation easement so that six wind towers could be built).
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transactions and state policy goals. This Article then examines
whether, in order to permit new energy development, a
conservation easement can subsequently be amended by the fee
owner and easement holder, and who must participate in this
process. This Article suggests that the rules concerning
modification and termination need to be clarified. The current
confusion frustrates environmentally-rational decisions and the
vindication of other public policies. Finally, this Article explores
non-consensual alterations to conservation easements—by judicial
action or eminent domain proceedings—that would permit new
energy activities on the land and concludes that they are of limited
application.
This Article examines the issue of conservation easements and
new energies by juxtaposing “environmentally friendly” renewables
and “environmentally threatening” fracking in order to force a
deeper inquiry into the question. If only renewables were considered
as examples, some pro-environment advocates may be willing to
relax enforcement of the conservation easement because “green”
purposes are being served. Similarly, if this Article only examined
scenarios involving non-renewable energies, some proponents of
increased exploitation of carbon fuels could be biased towards nonenforcement of the easement. By providing these counter
examples, however, the discussion can peel away rote reactions.
Consequently, there can be a more neutral analysis that examines
the intent of the parties to the easement, provides a sophisticated
exploration of the relative property rights, suggests a realistic legal
architecture to respond to evolving conditions, and vindicates the
public’s interest.
I. OVERVIEW OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AND NEW ENERGIES
A conservation easement is a restriction on land that prevents
current and successor owners from disturbing the property’s
natural, ecological, open, or scenic features.9 A typical easement
9. Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 170 (1981). See
generally RUSSELL L. BRENNEMAN, PRIVATE APPROACHES TO PRESERVATION
OF OPEN LAND (1967); Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation
Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and
Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433 (1984) [hereinafter Korngold, Conservation
Servitudes]; Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private
Conservation Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the
Public Land Use Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1039 [hereinafter Korngold,
Contentious Issues]; Gerald Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements:
A Means to Advance Efficiency, Freedom from Coercion, Flexibility, and
Democracy, 78 BROOKLYN L. REV. 467 (2013) [hereinafter Korngold,
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document contains a general promise not to interfere with these
natural attributes, along with specific prohibitions such as bans on
additional structures, removal of natural growth and timber, and
installation of roads.10 Conservation easements do not usually
provide for access by the public.11
Conservation easements are authorized by statute in all
American jurisdictions. These statutes are often enacted to address
questions concerning the validity of conservation restrictions under
the common law.12 Although there are some jurisdictional
differences, conservation easements usually share common
features. Easements may be held only by governmental units or
qualified NPOs; they are typically held “in gross”—the easement
holder does not need to own nearby land directly benefitted by the
easement; they usually are perpetual and are required to have
unlimited duration in order to be deductible under the Internal
Revenue Code; conservation easements are enforceable “in rem”
as property interests; and they bind successor owners of the
burdened land.13
A. Conservation Easement Data
There is a scarcity of data about the number, acreage, holders,
and location of conservation easements held by both NPOs and
governments. This has complicated policy assessment and

Governmental Conservation Easements]; Gerald Korngold, Globalizing
Conservation Easements: Private Law Approaches for International
Environmental Protection, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 585 (2011) [hereinafter Korngold,
Globalizing Easements]; Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational
Conflicts of Real Property Law: Preserving Free Markets and Personal
Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1525, 1525-27 (2007)
[hereinafter Korngold, Future Generations]; James Boyd et al., The Law and
Economics of Habitat Conservation: Lessons from an Analysis of Easement
Acquisitions, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 209 (2000); Zachary Bray, Reconciling
Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma of Conservation
Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119 (2010); Jessica E. Jay, When
Perpetual Is Not Forever: The Challenge of Changing Conditions, Amendment,
and Termination of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 (2012); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of
Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421 (2005).
10. Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 9, at
469–70.
11. Id. at 470 n.6. A limited right of access for the purpose of inspection to
determine compliance may be granted to the easement holder.
12. Id. at 470–71.
13. Id. at 471.
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decisions on easement costs and benefits.14 Some data can be
found in the Land Trust Alliance’s censuses of land trusts (a
voluntary survey) and in the Form 990s filed by NPOs under the
Internal Revenue Code. Moreover, in 2011 a consortium of NPOs
and federal agencies launched the National Conservation Easement
Database to gather, on a voluntary basis, information about
conservation easements.15 Table 1 sets out data derived from these
sources. This is only an incomplete picture, as some of the
reporting is voluntary and does not include all NPOs and
governmental units that may be holding conservation easements.16
Easements Held by
Government (2013)
Federal

Count

Acres

24,480

4,958,436

State

30,202

6,231,606

Local

13,803

1,071,668

Regional

65

3,993

Total

68,550

12,265,703

Easements Held by State and Count
Local Land Trusts (2010)
Total

Acres

Easements Held by The
Nature Conservancy (2012)
Total

Count

Acres

2367

2,888,283

Grand Total

8,833,368

23,987,354

Table 1. Number and acreage of conservation easements held by governmental entities,
(as of 2013), state and local land trusts (as of 2010), and The Nature Conservancy (as of
17
2012).

14. See id. at 475–76.
15. See What is the NCED?, NAT’L CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE,
http://nced.conservationregistry.org/, archived at http://perma.cc/5PJ9-D44Y
(last updated June 2014).
16. I have argued for increased legislative action to increase data collection.
Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1070.
17. See What is the NCED?, supra note 15 (for government easements);
2010 Land Trust Census, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE 6 (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts/land-trust-census/2010-final-report,
archived at http://perma.cc/9SX9-MWT8 (for land trusts); See The Native
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The data show that there has been tremendous and continued
growth in the number of conservation easements over the years.
The number of acres under conservation easement reported by
members of the Land Trust Alliance grew from several thousand in
1985 to 8.8 million in 2010.18
B. The Policy Calculus of Conservation Easements
There are various policy reasons supporting the validity and
enforcement of conservation easements. Conservation easements
allow landowners to exchange their development rights with
easement buyers in return for cash or tax advantages, thus
benefitting both parties.19 Future purchasers of the burdened land,
taking with notice of the easement, can adjust their bargaining
based on the restriction and should be presumed to consent to the
existing easement rights.20
These consensual, market-based transactions can increase the
efficient allocation of our limited land resources. Landowners can
liquidate property rights they no longer wish to retain; NPOs or
governments can conserve a piece of property by merely obtaining
an easement instead of overinvesting resources in obtaining a fee
interest that they do not actually need to achieve preservation.
Moreover, creation of conservation easements is consistent
with the concept that people may freely dispose of their property
by virtue of freedom of contract and property rights.21 Holders of
land are entitled to seek personal satisfaction by exercising free
choice with respect to the land. Thus, the decision to convey a
conservation easement should be respected. The law should
intervene in such consensual arrangements only in the most
unusual situations.
Conservation easements acquired by NPOs represent private
rather than governmental initiatives.22 By virtue of being private
action, NPO ownership shifts the cost of acquisition, monitoring,
stewardship, and enforcement from the government to private
resources.
Conservancy, 2012 Form 990, Schedule D, available at http://tinyurl.com
/mtg44b4, archived at http://perma.cc/BM2Q-3J7V (NCED and LTA data are
self-reported and may cause an undercount total conservation easements and
acreage).
18. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, supra note 17, at 6.
19. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1056.
20. Korngold, Conservation Servitudes, supra note 9, at 448–49.
21. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1056.
22. Id. at 1055.
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Governmental conservation easements have their own
advantages. When conservation easements are purchased by the
government, conservation is advanced through consent of the
owner rather than by the coercive means of governmental
regulation.23
The legislative validation of conservation easements reflects a
new American perspective towards land, which favors a balancing
of development against preservation values.24 Conservation
easements can bring increased social and economic value.
Conservation easements are praised for providing beautiful vistas,
species protection, atmospheric remediation, carbon dioxide
reduction, watershed preservation, and psychic gains.25 Proponents
assert economic gains also, including protection of ecological
capital for future generations, preservation of farmland for food
sources, and quality of life enhancement necessary to attract and
retain skilled labor.26 Conservation easements may also increase
the values of nearby land.27 Yet the conservation easement
phenomenon is more than the sum of its various benefits, as it
reflects a new American ethos favoring land preservation.28

23. See Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 9, at
477–78.
24. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1054–55.
25. See VIRGINIA MCCONNELL & MARGARET WALLS, THE VALUE OF OPEN
SPACE: EVIDENCE FROM STUDIES OF NONMARKET BENEFITS 48 (2005); LILLY
SHOUP & REID EWING, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF OPEN SPACE, RECREATION
FACILITIES AND WALKABLE COMMUNITY DESIGN, ACTIVE LIVING RES. 17
(2010), available at http://atfiles.org/files/pdf/Economic-Benefits-Active.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/BHK7-3G8A.
26. See Rand Wentworth, Economic Benefits of Open Space Protection,
LAND TRUST ALLIANCE (2003), http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conservation
/documents/economic-benefits.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V5X-4E8P; John
L. Crompton, The Impact of Parks on Property Values: A Review of the
Empirical Evidence, 33 J. LEISURE RESEARCH 1 (2001); GREEN SPACE
ALLIANCE, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PROTECTED OPEN SPACE IN
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA (Jan. 2011), available at http://economyleague
.org/files/Protected_Open_Space_SEPA_2-11.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/F7DS-V7XM.
27. Jacqueline Geoghegan, The Value of Open Spaces in Residential Land
Use, 19 LAND USE POL’Y 91 (2002).
28. See Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law and Society: The
Institutionalization of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 91–
94 (2001); D.T. Kuzmiak, The American Environmental Movement, 157
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 265, 265 (1991).
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C. The New Energies
The costs and benefits of the new energies and the ensuing
public policy choices present important questions, fraught with
conflicting scientific, economic, moral, and political views.29
These conflicting views continually change as new studies are
released and debated.30 A detailed examination of these competing
arguments is beyond the scope of this Article. What needs to be
understood for this Article is that each of the new energies pose
environmental costs (but to significantly varying degrees) that
could threaten the preservation goals of a conservation easement.
Moreover, while there is legislative and judicial support for
renewables, there are concerns advanced in case law about their
intrusion on neighboring landowners.31 These factors add a twist to
the resolution of conflicts between new energy development and
conservation easements.
1. Fracking
Briefly, modern fracking techniques marry traditional
hydraulic fracturing with horizontal drilling, which results in a
technologically feasible method for the removal of previously
29. Some have focused on governmental regulation of fracking, see, e.g.,
Hannah Wiseman, Fracturing Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 361, 382–84 (2012), while others have maintained that common law remedies
might suffice, see Merrill, supra note 4, at 989. For other discussion of fracking,
see Adam Garmezy, Note, Balancing Hydraulic Fracturing’s Environmental
And Economic Impacts: The Need For A Comprehensive Federal Baseline And
the Provision Of Local Rights, 23 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 405, 406 (2013);
James Kirkup, Church of England In ‘Fracking Land-Grab, THE TELEGRAPH
(Aug. 15, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10245697
/Church-of-England-in-fracking-land-grab.html, archived at http://perma.cc
/EG8H-TXLS (reporting on conflict created by the Church’s failure to rule out
fracking under its lands); Fred Siegel, Fracking, Poverty and the New Liberal
Gentry, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2013, at A15; Michele Wines, Colorado Cities’
Rejection of Fracking Poses Political Test for Natural Gas Industry, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2013, at A14; Stephen Castle, European Union Proposes Easing
of Climate Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2014, at A1 (EU decided against
proposing laws regulating environmental damage from fracking).
30. See, e.g., Michael Wines, Gas Leaks in Fracking Disputed in Study,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2013, at A12 (reporting on peer-reviewed study sponsored
by Environmental Defense Fund and nine petroleum companies that found
fracking releases less methane than previously thought and that shale gas is
cleaner than coal); Brian Resnick, Can Fracking Cause Earthquakes?, THE NAT’L
J. (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/energy/can-fracking-causeearthquakes-20130905, archived at http://perma.cc/S298-CDCD (reporting on
study making that conclusion).
31 Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision, 294 P.3d 427, 434 (Nev. 2013).
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unreachable gas and oil from shale rock. Traditional hydraulic
fracturing has been utilized for some 60 years and involves vertical
drilling into shale formations and injecting large volumes of water
mixed with sand or rocks and chemicals.32 The water mixture
breaks up the shale and releases previously trapped oil and gas.
Over recent years, technological innovations have made horizontal
fracturing possible, where the drill is sent down vertically, turned
on an angle, and fluids injected into the shale.33 This advance has
made fracking financially profitable in new regions of the country
and has opened up areas such as in Pennsylvania and New York to
this process.34 The Marcellus Shale deposit, lying under parts of
New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky,
Maryland, and Tennessee, contains approximately 141 trillion
cubic feet of “technically recoverable” natural gas according to the
United States Department of Energy in 2012, with the total United
States shale-based natural gas being 482 trillion cubic feet.35
Except in the most unusual situations, removal of oil and gas
by fracking on conservation easement land presents ecological
risks to the property. These potential risks include: excessive water
usage in the fracking process; contamination of groundwater, on
the parce itself and in aquifers under other land; disruption of the
surface and habitat due to installation of the drillpad, other
equipment, and roads; noise; harmful gas emissions affecting air
quality; and claims that reinjection of waste water causes
earthquakes.36 The degree of environmental damage will likely be
32. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 971–72; Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 1338–
40; State of N.Y. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 896 F. Supp. 2d 180, 185–
86 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Rachel Heron, Justin S. DuClos & Shaun A. Goho, The
Interpretation of Surface Easements in Severance Deeds As A Limit On
Hydraulic Fracturing Practices, 19 BUFF. ENVT’L L.J. 73, 78–79 (2012);
Garmezy, supra note 29, at 406–07.
33. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 971–72; Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 1338–
40.
34. See David Giller, Note, Implied Preemption And Its Effect On Local
Hydrofracking Bans in New York, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 631, 637–38 (2013).
35. AEO2012 Early Release Overview, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2012).pdf, archived at http://per
ma.cc/4ZRQ-7A2B (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). To provide a sense of scale, in
2012, the total U.S. consumption of natural gas was approximately 25 million
cubic feet. Natural Gas Consumption by End Use, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_cons_sum_dcu_nus_a.htm, archived at http:
//perma.cc/5KY4-DLGU (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). See also Joshua M. Tallent,
Comment, I Drink Your Milkshake? Potential Property Rights Repercussions of
natural Gas Exploration in New York State, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 413, 414 (2013).
36. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 185–86
(describing water pollution); Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact
Statement On The Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory Program, N.Y. ST.
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greater when the drilling rig is placed on the conservation land
itself, thus creating direct surface and related risks. When oil and
gas are removed from under conservation land by horizontal
drilling from a rig on a neighboring unrestricted parcel, there may
be limited surface damage on the conserved land, but there is still a
potential threat to ground water as well as risks due to noise, gas
emissions, and other fallout. There have been reports of differences
among conservation organizations as to whether they will permit
gas drilling on property on which they hold easements, with some
barring all drilling, others permitting horizontal drilling from other
properties, and some apparently allowing drilling, as well as
related structures and roads, on the conserved property itself.37
2. Renewables
Various legislatures have enacted statutes and courts have
decided cases based on a public policy favoring renewables.38 These
range from state zoning enabling acts that require facilitating wind
and solar access when possible in local ordinances,39 to California’s
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, which sets state goals to
create renewable energy,40 to general state policies to develop and
utilize renewable energy,41 to tax incentives to install renewable
energy devices.42 Use of renewable energy sources has increased.

DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION (2011), http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn
/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UU9G-EW2F; Giller, supra
note 34, at 638; Thomas Hooker, Note, Zoning Out Fracking: Zoning Authority
Under New York State’s Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law, 40 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 869, 870–71 (2012); Rachel Rawlins, Planning for Fracking on the Barnett
Shale: Urban Air Pollution, Improving Health Based Regulation, and the Role
of Local Governments, 31 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 226, 233–35 (2013); Resnick, supra
note 30 (reporting on study making that conclusion); Henry Fountain, Experts
Eye Oil and Gas Industry as Quakes Shake Oklahoma, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2013, at A20; Henry Fountain, Ohio Looks at Whether Fracking Led to 2
Quakes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2014, at A20 (reporting on commencement of
state department of natural resources investigation).
37. Paige Anderson, Note, Reasonable Accommodation: Split Estates,
Conservation Easements, and Drilling In The Marcellus Shale, 31 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 136, 143–44 (2013).
38. See infra Part II.C. for a discussion of statutes protecting solar devices
against homeowner association restrictions.
39. See, e.g., Wood v. City of Madison, 659 N.W.2d 31, 35 (Wis. 2003)
(quoting WIS. STAT. § 236.01).
40. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500 (West Supp. 2014).
41. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16a–35k (2008).
42. See Jeffrey D. Moss, Solar Panels, Tax Incentives, and Your House,
PROBATE & PROP. MAGAZINE 17 (Jan./Feb. 2010).
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As of 2011, 13 % of the United States’s electricity generation was
from renewable sources, primarily solar.43
Although these renewable goals and programs bring
environmental benefits, they are sometimes challenged for creating
negative environmental effects. For example, wind turbines are
sometimes opposed by neighboring landowners, local governments,
and others for interfering with habitats, dislocating wildlife, marring
vistas, generating noise, killing of local and migrating birds, and
creating “shadow flicker.”44 At least one court has found that a
residential wind turbine created an enjoinable nuisance because of
aesthetic, noise, shadow flicker, and property value concerns.45
There have also been challenges of the siting of solar fields based
on environmental impacts.46
These issues played out in an analogous land dispute reported in
2009.47 Woody Companies sought to lease federal land in the
Mojave Desert to build wind farms and major solar plants. Much to
the dismay of environmentalists seeking to promote such alternative
energy sources, Senator Diane Feinstein introduced legislation to
bar wind farms and solar plants on one million acres of the Mojave
because of concerns from local citizens that such projects would
destroy scenery and natural land features. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.
was quoted in the New York Times saying that “this is arguably the
best solar land in the world, and Senator Feinstein shouldn’t be

43. AEO2014 Early Release Overview, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 5 (Apr.
2013), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdf/0383er(2014).pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/U3T7-WM7S.
44. See Fairwindct, Inc. v. Conn. Siting Council, 2012 WL 5201354 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2012); GPH Cohasset LLC v. Trustees of Reservations, 2013 WL
3022390 (Mass. Land Ct. 2012); In re Green Mountain Power Corp., 60 A.3d
654 (Vt. 2012). See also Katharine Q. Seelye, Koch Brother Wages 12-Year
Fight Over Wind Farm, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2013, at A12; Peter Schworm &
David Filipoy, Flickering Shadows From Wind Turbines Draw Complaints,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/04
/04/turbine-flicker-effect-draws-complaints/UKgf7nOwMHm8CWAtZ47V5L
/story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/YR3M-ZWNE. (explaining shadow
flicker); Dan Frosch, A Struggle to Balance Wind Energy with Wildlife, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2013, at A18 (explaining bird kills); Diane Cardwell, U.S.
Offshore Wind Farm, Made in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2014, at B1
(explaining interference with view).
45. Sowers v. Forest Hills Subdivision, 294 P.3d 427, 434 (Nev. 2013).
46. See generally Save Panoche Valley v. San Benito County, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (upholding the solar power development
plan).
47. Todd Woody, Desert Vistas vs. Solar Power, N.Y. TIMES, December 21,
2009, at B1.
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allowed to take this land off the table without a proper and
scientific environmental review.”48
3. Achieving a Balance
New energies present complex scientific, economic, and policy
perspectives. There may be differences between environmentalists
focusing on preservation of land and species as the paramount
value and those emphasizing carbon reduction. Finally, the issues
get thornier when environmental values are juxtaposed with energy
security and economic development resulting from oil and gas
exploitation that benefits financially distressed areas. These
competing factors require a balancing of the goals of conservation
easements and new energy development.
A. Conservation Easement Tax Policy and New Energies
Some conservation easements are purchased for consideration
by governments or NPOs. In many situations, however, owners
donate conservation easements to these entities. While these
donors apparently are motivated by philanthropic intentions, the
donation of a qualified conservation easement may also provide
significant federal, state, and local tax benefits to the donor. These
benefits represent a significant tax subsidy to the public for
conservation easement creation.
1. Federal
Under Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), the
donor of a conservation easement to an NPO, federal, state, or
political subdivision may receive a federal income tax deduction.49
Deductions are allowed only for a conservation easement “granted
in perpetuity,”50 which explains why donated easements in the
various states are almost always of perpetual duration. It is
estimated that between 2002 and 2007, these deductions resulted in
$3.6 billion of lost tax revenue.51 The donation of a conservation
easement also serves to reduce the value of the property for federal

48. Id.
49. 26 U.S.C. § 170(c),(h) (2012).
50. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2).
51. Roger Colinvaux, The Conservation Tax Expenditure: In Search of
Conservation Value, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9–10 (2012).
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estate tax purposes, causing additional potential revenue losses for
the federal government.52
The indirect expenditure for conservation easements, notably
through the income tax deduction, raises various policy questions.
One issue outside the scope of this Article is whether the
government should subsidize any donor activity, and if so, to what
extent. A second level of inquiry, similarly outside the ambit of
this Article, is whether the investment in preserved open space
without public access is preferable to open space outlays that
provide access, such as playgrounds in urban areas.53
The question at hand is whether the provisions of the IRC and
accompanying Regulations further the articulated congressional
goal of protecting open space for the scenic enjoyment of the
public and habitat preservation. Under the IRC, a donation will
qualify for a deduction where its purpose is “preservation of open
space” that is “(I) for the scenic enjoyment of the general public, or
(II) pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, State or local
governmental conservation policy, and will yield significant public
benefit.”54 The first clause raises multiple questions. What does
“scenic enjoyment of the public” mean? Will there be a deduction
for the donation of a 100-acre tract where only 2 acres are visible
to the public from a roadway? Does the view have to be
environmentally or aesthetically special to give “enjoyment”?
Does a random half-acre parcel in a crowded urban area provide
more or less scenic enjoyment than 100 acres in wilderness area?
The IRS Regulations attempt to provide guidance to determine
“scenic enjoyment.”55 They state:
Preservation of land may be for the scenic enjoyment of the
general public if development of the property would impair
the scenic character of the local rural or urban landscape or
would interfere with a scenic panorama that can be enjoyed
from a park, nature preserve, road, waterbody, trail, or
historic structure or land area, and such area or
transportation way is open to, or utilized by, the public.56

52. 26 C.F.R. §25.2703-1(a)(4) (2014). Additionally, the IRC permits
postmortem donations of conservation easements by the estate, further lowering
the property’s value for estate tax purposes. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2031(c), 2055(f).
53. See Korngold,Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1060–61.
54. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A). See RP Golf, LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo
2012-282 (T.C. 2012) (rejecting claim of a clearly delineated governmental open
space policy on the facts).
55. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(h)(4)(d)(4)(ii).
56. Id.
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The Regulations then provide eight factors, most of which lack
clarity and are subject to debate.
Unclear scenic easement criteria present the opportunity for
abuses of deductions and wasting of funds that Congress intended
to support bona fide conservation easement efforts. The public
interest might be better served if scenic easements were deductible
only when there was a local, state, or federal governmental
certification that the easement serves a public conservation
purpose.57 The IRC already permits the validation of a scenic
easement with such governmental action; this could be required for
all scenic easements.58 This formulation might improve the process
for conservation easement creation and help to ensure that public
resources are well spent. There are costs, but arguably they are
outweighed by the benefits: as donors will have to get government
approvals, transaction costs and time delays will increase.
Bureaucracy could grow. Some owners may be dissuaded from
making contributions because of increased red tape. One data point
may provide comfort, however: Massachusetts currently requires
local and state governments to approve all conservation easements
as a condition to creation, unrelated to federal tax deductibility
issues.59 Nevertheless, Massachusetts has an active conservation
easement culture, with the second highest number of land trusts in
the country.60
2. New Energies and Federal Deductions
The IRC and Regulations may limit deductibility for
conservation easements where energy development takes place on
the preserved land. First, the IRC addresses some situations where
subsurface oil, gas, or other minerals and the right to access such
minerals are not included in the gift.61 When such mineral rights
are retained, the donation of a conservation easement will not be
57. I have suggested in earlier work that the public interest might be better
served if scenic easements were deductible only if there were a local, state, or
federal governmental certification that the easement serves a public conservation
purpose. Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1068.
58. Id. My suggestion would align scenic easements with historical
easements. The latter are deductible only if the land is listed in the National
Register or included in a registered historic district and certified by the Secretary
of the Interior as being of historic significance.
59. MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 184, §§ 31-32 (2014). Massachusetts is the only
state requiring governmental approval of all conservation easements.
60. 2010 National Land Trust Census Report, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE 17
(Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts/land-trust-census
/data-tables, archived at http://perma.cc/J26K-Y973.
61. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(6) (2012).
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considered exclusively for conservation purposes and thus not
deductible “if at any time there may be extraction or removal of
minerals by any surface mining method.”62 Because of this
provision, some lawyers counsel clients seeking conservation
easement deductions to specifically prohibit surface mining in the
easement document.63 Thus, the federal deduction affects the
structuring of conservation easement transactions and possibly state
policy goals.
Although surface mining is barred, the Regulations
contemplate other extraction activities on conservation easement
land that will not interfere with deductibility. The Regulations state
that a deduction will be permitted
in the case of certain methods of mining that may have
limited, localized impact on the real property but that are
not irremediably destructive of significant conservation
interests. For example, a deduction will not be denied in a
case where production facilities are concealed or
compatible with existing topography and landscape and
when surface alteration is to be restored to its original
state.64
It is unclear, however, whether a fracking operation could fit
within this illustration. The potential adverse environmental effects
on the conserved parcel itself––the building and the installation of
the drill pad and related infrastructure, building of roads,
disturbance of habitat, use of substantial water resources, and
possible pollution of water––may fail the “not irremediably
destructive of significant conservation interests” test. Moreover,
the possible negative ecological spillovers of fracking on adjacent
land, such as possible exhaustion and pollution of aquifers, may
also prevent the easement from achieving “conservation purposes,”
which is the predicate for receiving a deduction.65 Determining
these issues would require a factual examination of the nature of
any given operation, the particular parcel, and the effects on the
62. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(5)(B)(i). Great N. Nekoosa Corp. v. United States,
38 Fed. Cl. 645, 658 (Fed. Cl. 1997).
63. See William M. Silberstein, Pitfalls Galore: Mineral Development and
Conservation Easement Tax Law 414, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, CONSERVATION AND PRESERVATION EASEMENTS AND
COMMUNITY STEWARDSHIP ENTITIES, PRINCIPLES, DRAFTING PRACTICES, AND
PRACTICAL REALITIES (2008), SN055 ALI-ABA (Westlaw); Glass v. Comm’r,
471 F.3d 698, 703 (6th Cir. 2006) (referring to prohibition on mining activities
in conservation easement).
64. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g) (2008), Example 1.
65. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1)(C).
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land and surroundings. Slant drilling from another parcel, however,
may present less environmental impacts but may still be too
significant to allow deductibility.
3. State and Local Tax Subsidies
The creation of a conservation easement can also cause a
reduction in state and local tax revenues. Many states provide
income tax incentives for the donation of conservation easements
through deductions66 or income tax credits.67 Additionally, the
restrictions of a conservation easement reduce the assessed value
of the property, thus decreasing property tax revenues for the state
and local government.68 The decline in tax revenues leaves
municipalities with the prospect of lowering services or raising
taxes on other taxpayers to close the gap.
While federal and state law offer tax incentives for the creation
of conservation easements, the IRC may deny income tax
deductions if fracking takes place under certain conditions. The
risk of the loss of the deduction may lead a donor/fee owner to
require a ban on all fracking activities in the easement document.
II. TERMS OF THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT
Under contract theory, the conservation easement agreement
should control whether the fee owner or the fee owner’s transferee
66. See Jeffrey O. Sundberg & Richard F. Dye, Tax Property Value Effects
of Conservation Easements, (Lincoln Institute of Land Pol’y, Working Paper
WP06JS1, 2006), available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1128_Sund
berg_complete_web.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LV32-LNNC (noting that
the deduction is usually not provided by a specific state tax legislation but by the
state’s general tracking of the federal tax code and its deductions).
67. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 210(38) (Consol. 2014); N.C. GEN STAT. §
105-151.12 (2014). Colorado lost $85.1 million in revenue through easement
credits in 2005, up from $2.3 million in 2001 (though the Colorado program has
since been changed). K.C. Mason, Lawmakers Want to Tighten Controls on
Credit for Donated Land, 44 STATE TAX NOTES 146 (2007).
68. See, e.g., Jet Black, LLC v. Routt Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 165
P.3d 744 (Colo. App. 2006); Gibson v. Gleason, 798 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2005); McKee v. Dep’t of Rev. & Lincoln Cnty. Assessor, 2004 WL
2340265 (Or. Tax Ct. 2004). See also Joan M. Youngman, Taxing and Untaxing
Land: Open Space and Conservation Easements, 41 STATE TAX NOTES 747,
747–62 (2006) (questioning the hypothesis that increased values of surrounding
land due to the open space offsets the revenue loss); Jeffrey O. Sundberg, Tax
Incentives for Open Space Preservation: Examining the Costs and Benefits of
Preferential Assessment, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY 14 (Oct. 2013),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/2324_1664_Tax_Incentives_for_Open_Spa
ce_1013LL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/65E2-D48J.
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can engage in new energy development activities—solar, wind,
fracking—on the land. In an ideal transactional world, this is a
matter that the parties (or their lawyers) considered, negotiated,
agreed upon, and reduced to clear, comprehensible language. In a
good situation, the parties would have contemplated not just issues
apparent in the present day but also would have carefully
anticipated potential future scenarios that could arise.
Too often, however, parties fail to discuss essential issues and
align expectations, reduce their understanding to a clear writing, or
imagine what the future might look like. Furthermore, even the
most prescient parties and counsel are unable to predict coming
technological and related economic changes that would shift the
parties’ views of the deal, such as the combining of horizontal
drilling with hydrofracking. In such situations, differences may
ultimately arise when one party seeks to take a course of action
that the other believes is (or is not) permitted under the terms of
the writing. In such cases, courts will have to decide disputes as to
the meaning and extent of the understanding.
Because both conservation easements and emerging energy
practices are relatively new and continue to evolve, there are only a
few cases involving conflicts between these interests.69 This
section will isolate these two variables in several ways. First, it
will examine the rich body of law on interpretation of land
restrictions in general and the ways that courts have and should
approach disputes between the fee owner and the holder of a lesser
69. This examination assumes that the conservation easement has priority in
the property over the fee owner and over any third party holding a right to
extract oil and gas or erect solar devices and wind turbines. In this scenario, the
fee owner would have created the conservation easement and then either
retained all remaining rights or granted an extraction right to another, e.g. an oil
or alternative energy company. Assuming that the third party took with notice of
the conservation easement, the third party is bound by the conservation
easement and subordinate to it. See GERALD KORNGOLD & PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND TRANSFER,
FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT 269–86 (5th. ed. 2009); ANTHONY ANELLA & JOHN
B. WRIGHT, SAVING THE RANCH: CONSERVATION EASEMENT DESIGN IN THE
AMERICAN WEST 147 (2004) (stating in clause C. of model deed of conservation
easement that mineral rights owned by landowner are governed by the
easement). If, however, the extraction right of the third party was created prior
to the conservation easement, the NPO or government holders’ conservation
rights are junior (again assuming notice). Provisions in the easement that
conflict with the prior interest will, therefore, not be binding. See generally
Paige Anderson, Note, Reasonable Accommodation: Split Estates, Conservation
Easements, And Drilling In The Marcellus Shale, 31 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 136 (2013)
(suggesting use of the accommodation doctrine to protect properties where
mineral rights were severed prior to the placement of the conservation easement
on the property).
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interest (typically an easement or covenant). It will then analyze
general conservation easement cases (i.e., not dealing with new
energies) to see how courts have applied traditional construction
tools to these relatively new interests. The section will then explore
how cases have decided attempts by lot owners to develop oil, gas,
solar, and wind resources in the face of homeowner association
restrictions. Finally, this section will bring this analysis to bear in
the two recent cases that actually address a conflict between
fracking and an existing conservation easement and suggests how
parties, drafters, and courts might deal with such matters in the
future.
A. Constructional Norms for Private Land Use Agreements
The norms controlling the interpretation of private land use
agreements—covenants and easements—provide insights into how
conservation easements will be construed and applied by courts.
Ultimately, these interpretational rules will be important in
determining if a given conservation easement permits new energy
development.
As will be discussed in this section, despite the use of the term
“easement,” conservation easements are not traditional easements.
Rather, they are like covenants, which are negative in nature and
establish restrictions on property. Thus, the body of law
interpreting covenants should be used to construe conservation
easements.70 The polestar in interpreting conservation easements
under the “covenant” rubric should be the intent expressed in the
instrument. The result is the same for those who insist that
conservation easements should be interpreted like other “true
easements” since, as will also be developed below, the intention of
the parties determines the extent of an easement. Both easements
and covenants are consensual land use arrangements and it is
logical and desirable that the extent of these rights should be
controlled by the parties’ intent.
1. Interpreting Covenants
Courts often hedge, however, about giving unfettered
dominance to the parties’ intent when construing covenants. The
traditional conflict between freedom of contract and concerns over
restrictions of land reverberates in the statements, if not actions, of
courts interpreting covenants.
70. Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 2 describes creation, transfer, and
other aspects of conservation easements but is silent on interpretation doctrines.
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a. Should Intent Control?
Some courts state that covenants should be enforced “like other
contracts.”71 They announce that they will give effect to the
parties’ clearly expressed intent72 since public policy “favors the
fullest liberty of contract and widest latitude possible on the
disposition of one’s property.”73 Conversely, some courts continue
to declare that covenants will be strictly construed because they
limit the free use of property.74 This anti-restrictions bias serves to
curb the intent of parties in private land use arrangements.
The anti-restrictions bias in interpretation of covenants has
been directly rejected, however, by some courts that recognize the
efficiency benefits of these arrangements. One opinion, for
example, stated that “under the modern view, building restrictions
are regarded more as a protection to the property owner and the
public rather than as a restriction on the use of property, and the
old-time doctrine of strict construction no longer applies.”75 Many
courts try to balance these competing principles by stating that they
will enforce a covenant as written if its intent is clear, but if it is
ambiguous, they will strictly construe the instrument and resolve
doubts in favor of free use of land.76 As one court asserted:
In order to accommodate the principle favoring free and
unrestricted use of property and the principle favoring
individuals’ right to free contract in ordering their own
affairs, we have generally said that documents such as the
Community Declaration must be express in unambiguous
language to be enforceable contracts.77
71. Benton v. Bush, 644 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
72. See, e.g., Christian v. Flora, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 892, 899 (Ct. App. 2008);
Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass’n, Inc., 272 P.3d 491, 500–501 (Idaho
2012); Knudson v. Trainor, 345 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Neb. 1984).
73. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Watson, 65 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 872 (1953).
74. See, e.g., Orlando Lake Forest Joint Venture v. Lake Forest Master
Cmty., 105 So. 3d 646, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Davista Holdings, LLC
v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 741 S.E.2d 266, 269 (Ga. App. 2013); Taddei v. Vill.
Creek Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 725 S.E.2d 451, 453 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
75. Brandon v. Price, 314 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Ky. 1958), quoted in Triple
Crown Subdivision Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Oberst, 279 S.W.3d 138, 140
(Ky. 2009). Accord Aqua Fria Save the Open Space Ass’n v. Rowe, 255 P.3d
390, 394-396 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011).
76. See, e.g., Lamoreux v. Langlotz, 757 P.2d 584, 587 (Ala. 1988);
Woodglen Estates Ass’n v. Dulaney, 359 S.W.3d 508, 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012);
Estates at Desert Ridge Trails Homeowners Ass’n v. Vasquez, 300 P.3d 736,
743 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
77. Solowicz v. Forward Geneva Nat’l, LLC, 780 N.W.2d 111, 124 (2010).
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Arguably, courts should downplay concerns over restrictions
on land when interpreting and enforcing conservation easements.
The legislation expressly authorizing conservation easements in all
states demonstrates a public policy favoring these interests. While
in certain discrete scenarios, perpetual conservation easements may
raise anti-restriction policy concerns that would be relevant to a
court interpreting an easement instrument, the intent of the parties
to such legislatively authorized interests should generally be
paramount.
b. Finding the Intent
The parties’ intent should be the essential inquiry in enforcement
of conservation easements if the easements are interpreted under the
covenant rubric. However, finding the parties’ expectations in a
given covenant is not always an easy proposition. There is a general
lack of clarity in the manner of expression as well as varying views
in the states as to the permissible use of extrinsic evidence in
interpreting a document. These issues are manifest in construing all
types of contracts.
In determining the parties’ intent, a threshold consideration is
whether the court should look solely at the covenant in question or
whether it should consider extrinsic evidence. There are
jurisdictional and philosophical differences at work in this question.
Some courts take a broad approach, indicating that intent should be
found from both the covenant and circumstances surrounding its
execution.78 Others, though, are more circumspect in looking
beyond the language of the instrument itself. These courts declare
that if the language of the covenant is clear and unambiguous, the
court should not construe the covenant but should enforce the
language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.79 Only if the
writing is ambiguous is it proper to admit extrinsic evidence.80
The hard question is determining whether any given language
is ambiguous. The courts have struggled mightily, and in vain, to
78. See, e.g., Martin’s Landing Found., Inc. v. Land Lake Assocs., 707 F.2d
1329, 1333–1334 (11th Cir. 1983); CDR Devs., LLC v. College Hill Heights
Homeowners , LLC, 973 So. 2d 273, 280 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); Gosnay v. Big
Sky Owners Ass’n, 666 P.2d 1247, 1250 (1983).
79. See, e.g., Good v. Bear Canyon Ranch Ass’n, 160 P.3d 251, 253 (Colo.
App. 2007); 600 N. Frederick Rd., LLC v. Burlington Coat Factory of Md.,
LLC, 19 A.3d 837, 852 (Md. 2011); Fayard v. Design Comm. of Homestead
Subdivision, 230 P.3d 299, 303 (Wyo. 2010).
80. See, e.g., Divizio v. Kewin Enters., 666 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1983); Dierberg v. Willis, 700 S.W.2d 461, 468 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Cupola
Golf Course, Inc. v. Dooley, 898 A.2d 134, 139 (Vt. 2006).
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develop a workable general test and instead have offered circular,
elastic, unpredictable and contradictory statements.81 The results
are also difficult to harmonize. For example, one court found that a
ban on “trucks . . . house trailers . . . and trailers of every
description” was unambiguous and did not include motor homes,82
while another held that a prohibition against a “house trailer,
trailer, coach” was ambiguous leading to a construction barring
motor homes.83
Once a covenant is found to be ambiguous, the courts will
admit various types of extrinsic evidence such as the purpose of
the covenant and the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the instrument.84 They may also employ constructional canons,
such as ejusdem generis85 and the “last antecedent rule.”86
It is not easy, therefore, to find the parties’ intent in all
covenant situations. The language chosen by the parties may create
difficulties, and the courts’ interpretation devices and outcomes
make for unpredictable and contradictory results.
2. Construing Easements
Easements have long been respected and valued property
interests, allowing parties to create efficiency-maximizing private
arrangements such as right of ways, canals, railways, utility access,
and pipelines.87 With easements, courts do not express any of the
ambivalence that they state with covenants, nor do they manifest
fears that easements will create undesirable restrictions on
property. As a result, courts enforce express easements based on
the intent of the parties,88 unencumbered by anti-restriction
concerns.
81. For one example, contrast Rusanowski v. Gurule, 840 P.2d 595, 597
(N.M. Ct. App. 1992) with Dyegard Land Partnership v. Hoover, 39 S.W.3d
300, 309 (Tex. App. 2001).
82. Lake St. Louse Cmty. Ass’n v. Ledity, 672 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984).
83. Borowski v. Welch, 324 N.W.2d 144, 145 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
84. See, e.g., Strader v. Oaklery, 410 So. 2d 954, 956 (Fla. App. 1982);
Birch Tree Partners, LLC v. Windsor Digital Studio, LLC, 945 N.Y.S.2d 162
(App. Div. 2012); Breeling v. Churchill, 423 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Neb. 1988).
85. See, e.g., Campbell v. Glacier Park Co., 381 F. Supp. 1243, 1249–50 (D.
Idaho 1974).
86. See, e.g., Illini Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Elsah Hills Corp., 445 N.E.2d
1193, 1196 (Ill. App. 1983).
87. See Susan F. French, Design Proposal for the New Restatement of the
Law of Property—Servitudes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213, 1214 (1988).
88. See, e.g., Parris Props., LLC v. Nichols, 700 S.E.2d 848, 853 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2010), cert denied (2011); City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadow Prof’l Plaza,
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As with covenants, there are different easement interpretation
methods employed by the courts, and the range of views is similar
to those applied with covenants. Traditionally, most courts looked
solely at the document and the written word to find the parties’
intent.89 These courts consider extrinsic evidence only if the
language is ambiguous.90 Once again, the difficulty is determining
whether language is indeed ambiguous, and courts have differed
when interpreting the same language.91 When a document is
ambiguous, courts have commonly utilized certain types of
extrinsic evidence, including the circumstances at the time of the
instrument’s execution, practices of the parties since the
easement’s creation, direct evidence of the parties’ intent, previous
judicial constructions of similar language, and a general rule of
reason.92
Some courts, and the Third Restatement of Property,
promulgated in 2000, articulate a less rigid reliance on the words
of the written instrument and allow for an enhanced role of
extrinsic evidence in determining intent—apparently without
drawing a formal line between ambiguous and non-ambiguous
documents.93 The Third Restatement declares that “intention is
ascertained from the servitude’s language interpreted in light of all
the circumstances,”94 apparently allowing such extrinsic evidence

LLC, 293 P.3d 860, 865 (Nev. 2013); Borek v. Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. Jackson
Cnty., 785 N.W.2d 615, 625 (Wis. 2010).
89. See, e.g., Cobb v. Allen, 460 So. 2d 1261, 1264 (Ala. 1984); Borton v.
Forest Hill Country Club, 926 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); 810
Properties v. Jump, 170 P.3d 1209, 1213 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). See
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 482 (1944).
90. See, e.g., Walters v. McCall, 450 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Kwolek v. Swickard, 944 N.E.2d 564, 571-574 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011);
Tipperman v. Tsiatsos, 964 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Or. 1998).
91. For example, compare Deyling v. Flowers, 460 N.E.2d 280, 284 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that “ingress and egress” is unambiguous and allows
access by pedestrian and auto traffic) with Phillips Industries v. Firkins, 827
P.2d 706, 711-713 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (holding that “ingress and egress by
vehicles” was ambiguous requiring resort to extrinsic evidence resulting in
barring of trucks and requiring 24 hour notice for use of vehicles).
92. See GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS:
EASEMENTS, REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES 126 (2004)
[hereinafter KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS].
93. See, e.g., Hoffman Fuel Co. v. Elliott, 789 A.2d 1149, 1156 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2002); Kovanda v. Vavra, 633 N.W.2d 576, 585 (Neb. Ct. App. 2001);
Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Dickie, 43 P.3d 1277, 1281 (Wash. Ct. App.
2002). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 4.1, cmt. d
(2000).
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES, supra note 93.
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in all cases. This may represent a view that because language so
often may have multiple, or at least nuanced meanings, it is rare to
find truly non-ambiguous words. The danger of course is that the
written, final expression of the parties’ intention may be diluted by
other factors.
3. Successor Issues
Private land use agreements, whether cast as easements or
covenants, impact not only the original parties but also control the
subsequent owners of the parcels burdened and benefited by these
arrangements. A successor owner will be bound by prior interests,
such as easements and covenants affecting the parcel, if the
successor had notice of them prior to purchasing the property.95
Ambiguities in the original easement or covenant will create
uncertain legal effects for future holders of the land in question.
When courts determine the intent behind an easement or
covenant, however, they typically fail to recognize that the true
parties in interest may no longer be the original owners but rather
successors. The courts usually attempt to decide what the easement
or covenant meant to the original transacting parties, as if it were a
simple bilateral contract interpretation case. This could yield bad
results. For example, a side discussion or letter between the
original parties could be powerful evidence in interpreting their
intent in an action between them. But successor owners of the
affected parcels may not even know of such a discussion or letter.96
This letter or discussion might be good, even the best, evidence of
what the original parties intended. But it would do violence to the
contract expectations of the successors relying on the written and
recorded documents if this wild card evidence of “original intent”
were allowed. This could result in inefficient market decisions and
unfairness. For successor cases, the “purest meaning” might have
to give way to the “best expected meaning.”
Thus, courts should protect subsequent buyers by refocusing
the judicial inquiry.97 The question should be: At the time of
purchase, what could a reasonable successor have thought the
95. See KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 92, §§
5.02, 8.01; KORNGOLD & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 69, at 269–86.
96. See, e.g., Walters v. McCall, 450 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (unwritten expectation of original parties to easement as to extent of use
held binding against subsequent purchaser of dominant lot); Latham v. Garner,
105 Idaho 854, 673 P.2d 1048 (1983) (remanded for trial court to consider
circumstances surrounding execution of easement between defendants and
plaintiff—successor owner to the servient land).
97. Korngold, Future Generations, supra note 9.
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original parties intended? This would require the courts to adjust in
two ways. First, the courts should, whenever possible, rely on the
express language of the document in making decisions and should
eschew the use of extrinsic evidence if they can. Second, when
courts must admit extrinsic evidence because they cannot find the
understanding from the document alone, they should only admit
evidence to which the successors could reasonably have had
access.
Unfortunately, most courts interpreting land use instruments
miss the successor issue. They blithely state that deeds are to be
construed like “ordinary” contracts98 and rely on context at the
time of drafting regardless of the presence of successors.99 It is the
rare and appreciated case where the court understands that it is
engaged in a matter more subtle than first generation contract
interpretation. One such court insightfully noted that “[p]rospective
purchasers of property are . . . entitled to know what they will and
what they will not be permitted to park on their lots [and] nothing
in the language . . . is calculated to put the reader upon notice.”100
Therefore, interpretation of private land use agreements—
including conservation easements—should focus on the original
parties’ intent. When dealing with successor owners though, courts
should focus on the intention of the original parties in the mind of
a reasonable successor at the time of the successor’s purchase.
These rules should control a court’s analysis of a conservation
easement on the question of whether new energy development was
contemplated.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Conservation Easements in General
The interpretation of conservation easements, whether viewed
as “covenants” or as “true” easements, should center on the intent
of the original parties. While denoted as “easements,” conservation
easements do not truly resemble typical easements.101 Easements
usually grant affirmative rights in the property of another, such as a
right of way over another’s land. Instead, conservation easements
create negative restrictions on property, limiting the owner of the
burdened property from doing certain acts on the land. Thus,
98. See, e.g., Christian v. Flora, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 892 (Cal. App. 3d Dist.
2008); Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998); Wagner v. Woodward, 270 P.3d 21, 25 (Mo. 2012).
99. See, e.g., N. Utils., Inc. v. City of S. Portland, 536 A.2d 1116, 1117
(Me. 1988).
100. Lake St. Louis Cmty. Ass’n v. Leidy, 672 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984).
101. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1052–54.
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despite the term “easement,” conservation easements resemble
covenants. As described above, the law has historically valued and
enforced easements as utility-maximizing arrangements between
property owners.102 In contrast, courts have viewed covenants with
suspicion as hindering an owner’s freedom to deal with her
property. Thus, to the extent that courts follow the easement
paradigm based on the name “conservation easement” and
statutory provisions placing the creation of these interests within
the law of easements,103 it is more likely that courts will uphold the
conservation easement’s broad environmental purpose. On the
other hand, if a court sees a conservation easement as a covenant, it
may be more likely to construe it narrowly to encourage free use of
land.
Moreover, because conservation easements are typically
perpetual, successor owners will likely be involved in
interpretation and enforcement actions. The holder of the easement
could change, when the NPO or governmental entity that initially
acquires the conservation easement assigns it to another authorized
holder, perhaps in a situation where the acquiring entity acted as
facilitator or funder of the transaction.104 Similarly, when the initial
donor/seller of the easement transfers the remaining fee interest,
the transferee will take subject to the conservation easement. When
courts interpret conservation easements in such situations, they
should take into account the reasonable expectations and
understandings of successors as to the original intent.
The limited case law interpreting conservation easements
adheres to traditional interpretative norms for land agreements.105
102. See supra Part II.A.1.a. and II.A.2.
103. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 2(a) (1982) (providing that
creation is in the manner of other easements).
104. Id. (contemplating assignment of conservation easements). In some
cases, though, an organization with unlimited life might continue to hold the
conservation easement and the owner of the burdened property might similarly
be an entity with a perpetual life, such as a corporation.
105. See, e.g., Bjork v. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563, 571–72 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)
(“The same rules that apply to deeds and other written instruments apply to
grants of easements: in the construction of instruments creating easements,
courts ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties.”); Stitzel v. State,
6 A.3d 935, 940 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (relying on plain meaning of
agricultural easement to find that land could not be subdivided). See Wooster v.
Dept. of Fish & Game, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340, 345–46 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist.
2012) (interpreting a condition subsequent in a conservation easement). See also
Laura Ingles, Conservation Group Says Trump Golf Course Violates Easement
Policy, C-VILLE [Charlottesville], May 14, 2013 (describing claim that golf
course is permitted under language allowing commercial activity that is
“temporary or seasonal outdoor activities that do not permanently alter the
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In Nature Conservancy v. Sims,106 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the enforcement of a
conservation easement by the Conservancy against the original
grantors. The easement expressly permitted the grantors to
“enhance their agricultural usage” of the property and to “dig
wells” and “create ponds,” but barred the removal of topsoil or
other materials and any change in the topography. The court
upheld the trial court’s holding that the grantors’ filling of a
sinkhole behind their residence by placing over 6,000 cubic yards
of fill material into the depression violated the easement.107 The
appeals court upheld the trial court’s reliance on the plain meaning
of the document:
Where the language of a contract is not ambiguous
Kentucky law limits a court’s analysis to the “four corners
of the document.” . . . In determining a contract’s plain
meaning, the court is “obligated to read the parts of the
contact as a whole,” and when possible should embrace an
interpretation that “promote[s] harmony between the
provisions.”108
This decision is consistent with traditional interpretation
methods. Moreover, as the original parties were involved in the
enforcement action, there were no “second generation”
interpretation issues.
Similarly, in Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, the court
employed conventional interpretation methods in enforcing a
conservation easement.109 The original property owner conveyed a
conservation easement on 85 acres of a 100-acre tract to the
Windham Land Trust.110 Four years later, after an intermediate
conveyance, the defendants acquired the fee interest to the
burdened land.111 The easement limited the use of the restricted
area to “residential recreational purposes.”112 The owners sought to
use the existing logging roads on the property for wagon and sleigh
rides, hiking, snowshoeing, and Nordic skiing, and the pond for

physical appearance of the Property, and that do not diminish the conservation
values herein protected.”).
106. 680 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2012).
107. Id. at 676.
108. Id.
109. 967 A.2d 690, 695–96 (Me. 2009).
110. Id. at 693.
111. Id. at 695.
112. Id. at 693.
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fishing and ice skating—all for paying guests only.113 The
appellate court upheld the trial court’s finding that this was a
commercial use violating the conservation easement.114 The
appellate court relied on plain meaning principles:
The terms “residential recreational purposes” and “nonresidential use” are not defined in the deed. The
[defendants] urge us to apply a meaning of “residential” as
that word is, they argue, typically used in land use law. We
decline to do so. “In evaluating the language of a deed,
courts should give effect to the common or everyday
meaning of the words in the instrument.” . . . We apply the
common everyday understanding of the word “residential,”
which is “of or relating to residence or residences.”
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 977 (1979).115
Like Nature Conservancy v. Sims, Windham relied on classic
plain meaning principles. Moreover, although successor owners of
the servient property were involved in Windham, because the gap
between the creation of the easement and enforcement was so
short, it is extremely likely that the plain meaning of the original
parties would have been the same to the defendants when they
purchased the burdened property.
Therefore, in the limited case law, courts interpreting
conservation easements appear to apply traditional rules of
easement and covenant law to find the parties’ intent. Despite the
small number of cases, one would expect that these concepts
would pertain to construing conservation easements in the context
of new energy development.
C. Homeowner Association Covenants and Energy Exploitation
An examination of the body of cases involving disputes within
covenant communities over an individual owner’s oil, gas, or solar
development activities provides another reference point on how courts
may resolve conflicts over conservation easements and new energy
development. Beginning in the late 19th century, developers responded
to demand from people seeking homes in areas free from the noise and
pollution of an increasingly industrialized America.116 These
113. Id. at 694.
114. Id. at 701.
115. Windham Land Trust, 967 A.2d at 698.
116. See GERALD KORNGOLD, PROPERTY STORIES, 241–42, 257–259 (Gerald
Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss, eds., 2d ed.) (2009); Gerald Korngold, The
Emergence of Private Land Use Controls in Large-Scale Subdivisions: The
Companion Story to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 51 CASE. W. RES.
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developers created large-scale subdivisions by dividing raw land into
building lots. They employed traditional rules of covenants running
with the land to limit use of the properties to residential purposes,
restrict the types of permitted structures, delineate setback and side
lines, prohibit certain “nuisance” activities, and set other guidelines to
create a quality residential experience for the lot owners.117 Over time,
developers used covenants to create subdivisions with common areas,
such as roadways, utilities, and recreational areas, supported by
homeowner dues and administered by “private governments”
comprised of homeowners elected by their peers.118
These subdivision communities, formed and protected by
covenants, serve important policy goals inherent in the concept of
freedom of contract. They allow people to arrive at efficiency
maximizing arrangements in the marketplace (why does everyone
need a swimming pool, when a community pool is cheaper and gives
enough opportunity to swim?) and permit people the freedom to
choose the living arrangement that they believe will maximize their
happiness. Many courts have recognized the value of private
subdivision arrangements, a shift from their historical suspicion of
covenants as interfering with free use of land.119 This new attitude is
reflected in both express statements of the courts120 and in various
decisions upholding these arrangements.121

L. REV. 617, 618-621 (2001) [hereinafter Korngold, Private Land Use
Controls].
117. For examples of early subdivision communities, see Downs v. Kroeger,
254 P. 1101, 1102–03 (Cal. 1927); Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496, 498
(Mich. 1925); Neponsit Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15
N.E.2d 793, 795 (1938). See also Korngold, Private Land Use Controls, supra
note 116, at 621–23, (describing of one such community’s development, Shaker
Heights, Ohio).
118. See Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Flaws of Residential Servitudes and
Owners Associations: For Reformation Not Termination, 1990 WIS. L. REV.
513, 513 (1990).
119. See Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, 967 A.2d 690 (Me. 2009); Downs,
254 P. 1101; Sanborn, 206 N.W. 496; Neponsit Prop. Owners, 15 N.E.2d 793.
120. See, e.g., Beverly Island Ass’n v. Zinger, 317 N.W.2d 611, 612 (Mich.
1982) (“Building and use restrictions in residential deeds are favored by public
policy.”); Town Country Estates Ass’n v. Slater, 740 P.2d 668, 671 (Mich.
1987) (“Free use of the property must be balanced against the rights of the other
purchasers in the subdivision.”); Dixon v. Van Sweringen Co., 166 N.E. 887,
892 (Ohio 1929) (“We see no reason for denying the right of these parties to
contract between themselves . . . to create a highly exclusive and valuable
residential district.”). See Cottrell v. Miskove, 605 So. 2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2d Dist. 1992). See also Lake Saint Louis Cmty. Assoc. v. Kamper, 503
S.W.2d 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
121. See cases cited supra note 105.
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There are several cases where courts have determined whether
a given subdivision covenant bars oil and gas drilling, solar panels,
or wind turbines.122 These decisions are instructive for deciding
conflicts between new energies and conservation easements. First,
like conservation easements, subdivision covenants require the
preservation of a certain ambience on the land, which new energy
development might destroy. Second, both subdivision covenants
and conservation easements are supported by public policy
considerations articulated by legislatures and courts. Thus, one
might expect generally favorable judicial treatment of subdivision
covenants when challenged by external threats, such as intrusive
new energy development.
1. Oil and Gas Drilling
A number of reported cases involve subdivision covenants that
expressly bar oil and gas drilling and related exploration
operations.123 Hirsch v. Hancock, decided by the California Court
of Appeal in 1959, demonstrates, however, that courts may have to
construe such express prohibitions.124 In Hirsch, subdivision
covenants created in 1919 required residential use of the properties
and provided that no lot could be used for drilling or producing oil,
gas, or other minerals. Approximately half of the lot owners
brought an action and received a judgment from the lower court to
the effect that it would be unjust to prevent the removal of
subsurface oil, gas, and other minerals from their properties by use
of slant drilling from surface locations other than these owners’
parcels.125 This judgment was upheld by the appellate court, which
distinguished between surface removal of oil and gas, which was
prohibited, and subsurface removal via slant drilling from other,
unrestricted properties.126
The slant drilling distinction did not appear in the words of the
restriction. The appellate court reached its result by focusing on the
122. See cases discussed infra in Part II.C.1., 2., & 3.
123. See, e.g., R & R Realty Co. v. Weinstein, 422 P.2d 148, 161 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1966) (prohibiting drilling, derricks or similar structures); Lesley v.
Veterans Land Bd., 352 S.W.3d 479, 484–85 (Tex. 2011) (barring drilling);
Imperial Interplaza II, Inc. v. Corr. Corp. of America, 717 S.W.2d 422, 424
(Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1986) (barring oil drilling, refinement,
operations, tanks). See also Thompson v. Paasche, 950 F.2d 306, 309 (6th Cir.
1991) (covenant barring structures did not apply because mineral estate was
excepted).
124. See Hirsch v. Hancock, 343 P.2d 959 (Cal. 1959).
125. Id. at 755.
126. Id. at 760–61.
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intent of the subdivider and original purchasers.127 It reasoned that
slant drilling was unknown in 1919 when the restrictions were
imposed.128 “[T]he parties did not have in mind the possibility of
that sort of oil development” and therefore could not have intended
to bar it.129 The decision, however, fails to adequately determine
the parties’ intent. The fact that they did not specify slant drilling
cannot necessarily be seen as a conscious decision to permit it,
because, as the court states, the practice was not known when the
covenant was made. The court should have attempted to “fill the
gap” in the agreement by determining what the parties would have
intended on this issue had they confronted it. Moreover, because
successors were involved in the action, as previously suggested,
the court should have focused on what they could have reasonably
thought the parties intended on slant drilling in light of the
language and circumstances.
While the covenant in Hirsch expressly prohibited oil and gas
exploration, the court found it did not apply to the particular
removal method before it.130 In other cases, however, the covenant
contained no express discussion at all of oil and gas activities. In
these cases, the courts had to decide whether drilling activity or
equipment violated the terms of restrictions that limited the
subdivision to residential activities. Some decisions have found
that drilling and related activities violate covenants that
specifically limit the use of lots to residential purposes.131 As the
court in Reed v. Williamson reasoned:
It may not be concluded that the drilling of a well or wells
for oil and gas is a use of the lots for residential purposes or
that a limitation on the use of the real estate like that
contained in the restriction in this case does not exclude
every use of the premises not pertaining to residence
purposes.132
One might fairly classify Reed as a plain meaning decision, as
the court looked at the words of the restriction and ascribed to
them a meaning in light of ordinary usages of the words. For the
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Hirsch, 343 P.2d at 760.
130. Id. at 760–61.
131. See, e.g., Reed v. Williamson, 82 N.W.2d 18, 25–27 (Neb. 1957)
(showing oil and gas drilling not consistent with use for residential area);
Devendorf v. Akbar Petroleum Corp., 577 N.E.2d 707, 709–10 (Ohio Ct. App.,
Summit County 1989) (providing that the mere formation of drilling units on a
lot without drilling violated restriction).
132. Reed, 82 N.W.2d at 113 (1957).
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court, enforcement was a simple matter of holding a person to
one’s contractual obligations:
The instrument expressing the restrictions contains reciprocal
and mutual covenants. Appellant thereby bound himself not to
violate the covenants and if he did, anyone interested in the
real estate was authorized to enforce them or sue for damages
at his election.133
Courts have also held that covenants restricting the type of
structures that can be built in a subdivision, rather than the use of
the lots, may prevent the erection of wells and other drilling
equipment. Thus, restrictions stating that “all lots in this plat are
restricted to residences only,” with an exception for a few lots “on
which retail business buildings or apartment houses may be
erected,” prevented drilling for oil and gas.134 The court explained
its interpretative theory:
Under the rule of strict construction . . . this clause does not
prevent drilling wells for oil and gas. But this seems to us
to strain the plain import of the language used. The clause
is not ambiguous. The clear intention of the parties
gathered from the clause in its entirety is that Lincoln
Terrace addition must be used exclusively for residences
and no other purpose, except that in block 20 these
restrictions are relaxed to permit retail business buildings or
apartment houses. Aside from these specified uses, all other
uses are prevented in block 20 as well as the other blocks in
the addition.135
The decisions construing subdivision covenants, therefore,
focus on the plain meaning of the word “residential” and prohibit
oil and gas drilling. Depending on the terms of a given
conservation easement, a court using such a plain meaning
approach may reject similar activities on conservation easement
property. The slant drilling situation, however, presents a different
issue as no non-residential “structure” is being installed on the
conservation land and the non-residential “use” or “activity” is
only beneath the surface. A court might find, perhaps, that slant
133. Id. at 112.
134. See, e.g., Sw. Petroleum Co. v. Logan, 71 P.2d 759, 760 (Neb. 1937);
Smith Oil Co. v. Logan, 71 P.2d 766, 767 (Ok. 1937). These are companion
cases that call into doubt a contrary result in the earlier Cooke v. Kinkead, 64
P.2d 682 (Ok. 1937) (a 5-4 decision finding drilling compatible with a
residential only restriction). Cooke’s position appears to be an outlier, within
Oklahoma and nationally.
135. Smith Oil Co., 71 P.2d at 767–68.
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drilling from an unrestricted land under conservation easement
property is permitted under such a reading.
2. Solar
Individual homeowners have faced litigation from neighbors
and homeowners associations claiming that the homeowner’s
installation of solar panels or related technology violates a
subdivision covenant. The devices arguably violate aesthetic or
architectural standards that subdivisions impose generally to
protect aesthetic and property values of the community. The results
in these cases are often guided by express statutory policies
favoring non-renewables.136
In one case, homeowners installed six, 14-foot high, 8-foot
wide solar panels in their side yard.137 Neighbors brought suit
alleging that the panels violated restrictive covenants governing the
subdivision.138 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s
dismissal of the complaint.139 The appellate court reasoned, in light
of the high aesthetic values of the community, that the complaint
stated a cause of action for breach of covenant that provided that
no “nuisances [shall] be maintained . . . which may in any manner
[be] dangerous or noxious or offensive to the neighborhood
inhabitants.”140 The opinion focused on the meaning of the
agreement of the parties—standard interpretation of intention—and
did not mention countervailing policy considerations favoring
renewable energy.141
A number of states have trumped private agreements by
enacting legislation limiting the enforcement of aesthetic
covenants against solar energy devices.142 These statutes reflect

136. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-168 (2002) (limiting effect of
aesthetic restrictions on solar devices); Palos Verdes Homes Ass’n v. Rodman,
227 Cal. Rptr. 81 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1986) (requiring proposed solar units to be
submitted to the association’s “art jury” and to comply with solar unit
guidelines). See also Evan J. Rosenthal, Letting the Sunshine In: Protecting
Residential Access to Solar Energy in Common Interest Developments, 40 FLA.
ST. L. REV. 995 (2013).
137. Faler v. Haines, 962 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t.
2013).
138. Id. at 501.
139. Id. at 502.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-439 (2003); CAL. CIV. CODE § 714
(2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-168 (2002). See generally Governor’s Ranch
Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Gunther, 705 P.2d 1011 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (finding
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“the policy of the state to promote and encourage the use of solar
energy systems and to remove the obstacles thereto,”143 and require
aesthetic considerations to take a secondary position behind energy
goals. The California Solar Rights Act, for example, bars homeowner
associations from imposing covenants that effectively prohibit
installation of a solar energy system.144 The statute, however, allows
“reasonable” restrictions on a solar energy system “that do not
significantly decrease its efficiency or specified performance, or that
allow for an alternative system of comparable cost, efficiency, and
energy conservation benefits.”145 Decisions concerning the
reasonableness of the association’s decision are findings of fact,
requiring deference from the appellate courts.146 These cases focus on
statutory interpretation primarily rather than on the understanding of
the covenant. In these states, public policy via statute is the controlling
consideration, rather than private agreement.
3. Wind Turbines
One reported case, which held that the erection of a wind turbine
did not create a private nuisance, briefly considered whether the
turbine violated a subdivision covenant that required approval from an
architectural board before construction.147 The court held that there
was no violation because the developer and other residents had
abandoned the covenants, a type of waiver theory.148 The court,
therefore, did not explicate the meaning of the covenant but rather
applied a rule of law abrogating it.
4. Lessons for Conservation Easements and New Energies
While there are a limited number of cases dealing with the
conflict of subdivision covenants and new energy development,
that evaporative device combined with solar panels constituted protected solar
device under the statute).
143. Tesoro Del Valle Master Homeowners Ass’n v. Griffin, 133 Cal. Rptr.
3d 167, 175 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2011). See Garden Lakes Cmty. Ass’n v.
Madigan, 62 P.3d 983 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
144. CAL. CIV. CODE § 714(a) (2007). See Tesoro, 133 Cal. Rptr.3d at 173.
145. CAL. CIV. CODE § 714(b). See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-168 (limiting
effect of aesthetic restrictions to “reasonable restrictions…which do not
significantly increase the price of the device”).
146. See, e.g., Garden Lakes, 62 P.3d at 986; Palos Verdes Homes Ass’n v.
Rodman, 227 Cal. Rptr. 81, 83 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1986).
147. Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635, 639 (N.D. 1992).
148. On abandonment in general, see KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE
ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 92, at § 11.05.
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some tentative lessons may be drawn for treatment of conservation
easements by way of analogy. First, when interpreting the
subdivision covenants, the courts focus primarily on the language
of the instrument. The courts exhibit a tendency to find the intent
of the parties from the “plain meaning” of the language. Moreover,
to the extent that judges consider policy to support their
interpretations, they appear to focus exclusively on the mutuality
of the restriction and expectation of all of the homeowners that the
subdivision plan would be respected. The countervailing policies,
such as the benefits of solar energy or the public demand for fossil
fuels, were not considered unless there was an express statute
requiring the covenant to give way to solar devices. But again, the
sample is small.
Thus, it is possible that when courts entertain claims that a
conservation easement permits new energy development, they will
limit their inquiry to the specific language used by the parties and,
perhaps, the clearly articulated legislative policy favoring
conservation easements as exemplified in authorizing statutes. The
courts could follow the limited case law from homeowners
associations, and not delve too greatly into countervailing public
policies that favor new energy development (carbon-based,
renewable, or both). Proponents of the consideration of other
policies will have to convince the court to take a broader view than
exemplified in the subdivision interpretation cases.
D. Cases Involving Fracking on Land under Conservation
Easements
Courts confronting the question of whether a conservation
easement permits new energy development will have to determine
the intent of the parties under the instrument. Some easement
language may address the issue directly: an express prohibition on
“removing any fossil fuel” from the property would apparently ban
fracking. Other clauses may not be so clear: Would a ban on
accessory structures necessarily include wind turbines? The variety
of conservation easements employed by parties to such transactions
will require close consideration by courts where the intention is
unclear.149
149. Language that might be relevant to the permissibility of new energy
development can be found in the following sample conservation easements:
Sample 1. JULIE ANN GUSTANSKI, PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, 516–22 (Julie Ann Gustanski &
Roderick H. Squires, eds., 2000). (Grant of Conservation Easement and
Declaration of Restrictive Covenants, set out as Appendix B). Sample 1
provides for a grant of a conservation easement in gross “for the purpose of
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Two recent cases have addressed the specific question of the
permissibility of fracking on land restricted by conservation
easements. They illustrate the difficulties inherent in easement
language that does not clearly address the issue.
1. Stockport Mountain
Stockport Mountain Corporation LLC v. Norcross Wildlife
Foundation, Inc. was the subject of three unpublished opinions by
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania––one released in March 2012, a second in August

preserving the natural state of the Property for . . . conserving and protecting the
Property and surrounding lands from soil erosion, water pollution, natural
disruptions and other occurrences which might interfere with the beauty and
unique character of the Property.” Further, the Grantor “covenants and agrees
with Grantee that the Property shall remain in its present nature and scenic
state.” Specific clauses bar “commercial and/or industrial activities including . . .
the construction . . . of pipe lines; construction that will “destroy or impair the
scenic enjoyment of the view by the public;” and the “removal of rock, minerals,
gravel, sand, topsoil or other similar materials.” The grantor is permitted to build
“accessory buildings such as garages and storage sheds” in the vicinity of the
permitted single family residence.
Sample 2. John G. Cameron, Jr., What You Should Know About Conservation
Easements (With Form), 26 PRAC. REAL ESTATE. LAWYER 9 (July 2010).This
form contains the grant of a conservation easement. It additionally states that
“the Property possesses natural, scenic, open space, scientific, biological and
ecological values of prominent importance to the Donor, the Conservancy and
the public,” known as “Conservation Values.” It offers an apparently broad
protection of the existing environmental conditions by stating that “any activity
on or use of the Property inconsistent with the purposes of this Conservation
Easement or detrimental to the Conservation Values is expressly prohibited.”
The form also bars certain activities, including, “commercial or industrial
activity,” “the placement or construction of any man-made modification, such as
buildings, structures, fences, roads and parking lots,” and “any mining or
alteration of the surface of the land.”
Sample 3. ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION
EASEMENT HANDBOOK, (The Land Trust Alliance and the Trust for Public Land
CD-ROM, 2nd ed. July 2005). Sample 3 contains a similar broad definition of
Conservation Values and states that the purpose of the conservation easement is
to preserve and protect these values. It provides that “any activity on or use of
the Protected Property that is inconsistent with the purposes of this easement is
prohibited.” The form includes specific bans on “industrial or commercial use”
and on “mining, drilling, exploring for or removing of any materials or fossil
fuels;” this latter clause, appears to clearly bar oil and gas extraction through any
means, a matter about which the other forms were not as definitive. Sample 3
also provides that “no temporary or permanent buildings, structures, roads or
other improvements of any kind may be placed or constructed” on the property.
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2013, and a brief opinion in 2014.150 In Stockport I, the plaintiff,
Stockport—owner of land subject to a conservation easement held
by the defendant Norcross Wildlife Foundation (Norcross)—
brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it was
permitted to drill and extract natural gas through fracking on the
property.151 The land had originally been acquired in fee by a
subsidiary of Norcross, which conveyed the easement to Norcross
and then conveyed the fee to Stockport.152
Norcross sought a motion to dismiss the complaint and
Stockport filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.153 The
opinions in this case illustrate the key role of the judiciary in the
interpretation of the intention of the parties. The court applied
construction devices utilized in covenant and easement law, as well
as specific subject matter related policies.154
In Stockport I, the court dismissed Stockport’s motion for
summary judgment and then addressed Norcross’s motion to
dismiss, applying the standard of whether the complaint alleged
sufficient facts to sustain the cause of action.155 Norcross claimed
that the proposed extraction of natural gas by hydrofracture drilling
violated the express language of the conservation easement.156
Although fracking was not listed as a prohibited activity in the
easement document, Norcross claimed that it was prohibited
because of Pennsylvania’s “preference for liberally construing
conservation easements.”157 The court cited the state’s enabling act
language that provides that “any general rule of construction to the
contrary notwithstanding, conservation or preservation easements
shall be liberally construed in favor of the grants contained therein
to affect the purpose of those easements and the policy and the
purpose of this act.”158
The court explained that it would follow Pennsylvania’s rule of
construction.159 First, the court would look at the language of the
contract to determine intent, and if the language was unambiguous,
150. Stockport Mt. Corp. LLC v. Norcross Wildlife Found., Inc., 2012 WL
719345 (U.S. Dist. Ct. M.D. Pa. 2012) (Stockport I), 2013 WL 4538822 (U.S.
Dist. Ct. M.D. Pa. 2013) (Stockport II). A subsequent opinion, 2014 WL 116311
(U.S. Dist. Ct. M.D. Pa. 2014) upheld an award of attorney’s fees to Norcross.
151. Stockport I, 2012 WL 719345 at *2.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at *7.
155. Id. at *5–6.
156. Stockport I, 2012 WL 719345 at *5–6.
157. Id. at *6.
158. Id. See also 32 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5055(c)(2) (West 2001).
159. Stockport I, 2012 WL 719345 at *7.
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the court would enforce the express language.160 The court then
noted that easement grants are to be construed like contracts,
apparently following the “easement” label in conservation
easements rather than their true nature as covenants.161 Norcross
claimed that the easement was unambiguous and that drilling
violated three express prohibitions of the easement: the drilling
constituted prohibited “industrial or commercial uses;” resulted in
the “depositing … of chemical substances” on the property; and
required installation of “new roads.”162 Additionally, fracking
violated the express purpose of the easement to preserve
conservation values, protect plant life and habitats, and prevent soil
erosion and water pollution.163 Finally, the fracking operation
otherwise interfered with the property’s beauty and unique
character in its then current state.164
The court, however, rejected Norcross’s claim that the right to
pursue fracking was clearly and unambiguously prohibited by
easement and denied the motion to dismiss.165 Rather, the court
found that the “crucial provisions” of the easement were
ambiguous.166 The court noted that “[a]lthough this statement
outlines the parties’ aspirations, the court cannot determine at this
stage in the litigation that this provision prohibits natural gas
drilling because it is too vague.”167 The court also found that
despite the stated ban on industrial and commercial uses, other
provisions in the easement approved certain of such uses.168 Thus,
discovery was required to determine the intended definitions of
“commercial” and “industrial.”169 Moreover, Stockport’s allegation
that the prohibition of chemical release only applied to surface
chemicals and that it planned only a subsurface release rendered
the easement clause ambiguous.170 Finally, Stockport alleged that
construction of new roads was largely unnecessary.171 Thus, the
court found that Stockport had “adequately pled facts creating
ambiguity,” and a motion to dismiss was not appropriate.172
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Stockport I, 2012 WL 719345 at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Stockport I, 2012 WL 719345.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id.
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In Stockport II, however, the same judge considered a motion
for summary judgment by Norcross after the parties engaged in
discovery and fully briefed and argued the issue.173 The court, in
this second opinion, granted the motion for summary judgment
finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed with respect
to the permissibility of surface drilling under the conservation
easement. Interestingly, the court deviated from its prior opinion
on the motion to dismiss where it found ambiguity.
The court in Stockport II explained that the burden to show
ambiguity rests on the party making that claim.174 To determine if
a contract is ambiguous, the court said it would consider the
language of the instrument, alternative meanings suggested by
counsel, and objective evidence such as the bargaining history and
the parties’ conduct that reveals their understanding of the
words.175 But, the court declared that it ultimately came down to
the language that the parties used in the agreement: “Extrinsic
evidence notwithstanding, the parties remain bound by the
appropriate objective definition of the words they use to express
their intent.”176 The court went on, “The words constituting the
conservation easement are susceptible to only one reasonable
interpretation with respect to the instant issue; surface natural gas
drilling is prohibited. To reach this conclusion, the court did not
need to look beyond section 4(c) of the easement, which prohibits
‘industrial or commercial uses of any kind.’”177 The court then
looked to dictionary definitions of “commercial” and “industrial”
to find that Stockport’s planned lease to a natural gas driller in
return for rent and royalties was “commerce” and the use of
machinery to drill and remove natural gas was “industrial” in
nature.178 Moreover, the court indicated that the ambiguities that it
had noted in Stockport I—such as the easement expressly
permitting timbering and quarrying—no longer compelled a
finding of ambiguity.179 Finally, the court noted that the absence of
an express prohibition on drilling does not create an ambiguity.180
173. Stockport II, 2013 WL 4538822 at *7. Judge James M. Munley, United
States District Judge, presided in both Stockport I and Stockport II. See id. at *1;
2012 WL 719345 at *1.
174. Stockport II, 2013 WL 4538822 at *9.
175. Id. at *10.
176. Stockport II, at *10 (quoting Baldwin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr.,
636 F.3d 69, 76 (3d Cir. 2011); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc.,
619 F.2d 1001, 103 (3d Cir. 1980)).
177. Id. at *10.
178. Id. at *11.
179. Id. at *11–12.
180. Id.
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The court explained that extrinsic evidence supported its reading
that the language of the conservation easement unambiguously barred
drilling for natural gas.181 Stockport argued that the parties did not
contemplate the feasibility of shale gas production by fracking when
they signed the conservation easement, and thus did not intend to bar
it.182 The court, however, turned this proposition on its head, noting
that “[t]he external evidence Stockport points to, however, does not
reasonably establish that the parties to the conservation easement
intended to permit surface gas activities.”183 The court instead chose to
rely on what it considered to be the unambiguous language of the
agreement. Given that the parties had apparently not considered the
fracking issue because technology did not permit it at the time, the
court should have gone beyond the words and looked at other evidence
to discern what the parties would have intended on the issue.
There are several important takeaways from the two Stockport
opinions. They illustrate the difficulty in determining whether any
given language is “ambiguous” or “unambiguous”—the same court
appears to have changed its view on this issue from the first to the
second opinion. Language that can be fairly read to prohibit
fracking—commercial and industrial use bans—may not be clear
enough to survive a motion to dismiss. Thus, there are limits to the
“plain meaning” even when the meaning is arguably clear. As a result,
a trial will be required to consider extrinsic evidence to find the
parties’ intent. This will be costly for both sides—for an NPO or
entrepreneurial company with constrained capital—and time
consuming—extending the period of uncertainty for the nonprofit and
postponing a return on investment for the company. Stockport
Mountain demonstrates that it is essential not only to make the intent
clear, but also to make it sufficient to be adjudicated without an
evidentiary showing. The parties could attempt to settle after denial of
a motion to dismiss, but this would require flexibility and, as discussed
below, the NPO may be hampered in attempts to modify the easement
through settlement. For parties concerned about oil and gas drilling,
the best protection would be through an express clause in the original
easement agreement.
2. Ray v. Western Pennsylvania Conservancy
In Ray v. Western Pennsylvania Conservancy, the plaintiffs’
predecessor in title granted a conservation easement, which was
181. Id. at *13.
182. Stockport II, at *13.
183. Id. at *14 (emphasis added).
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recorded, to the defendant-conservancy.184 Some two weeks later
the predecessor conveyed the land in fee to plaintiffs.185 Plaintiffs
brought a declaratory judgment action seeking an interpretation of
the conservation easement as they sought to permit removal of oil
and gas from their property by horizontal drilling from an adjacent,
unrestricted lot.186 The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a
judgment on the pleadings.187
The trial court agreed with the Stockport opinions on the
interpretative ground rules in Pennsylvania, stating that “[w]hen
the words of an agreement are clear and unambiguous, the intent of
the parties is to be ascertained from the language used in the
agreement.”188 Importantly, the easement in Ray contained an
express provision stating that “[n]o drilling or other removal of . . .
gas . . . or similar . . . materials from the real estate shall occur.”189
Plaintiffs argued, though, that the easement was meant only to
protect surface features of the land, and thus subsurface horizontal
drilling from a neighboring tract should be permitted.190
Ray, like Stockport II, relied on a reading of the easement
instrument alone to prohibit the proposed drilling. Following the
opinion of Stockport I, the court could have found the Ray
language ambiguous for failing to clarify the distinction between
surface and subsurface drilling and denied a decision on the
pleadings; or the court may have required factual determination of
the effects of the different processes on the protected land, specific
understandings of the parties, and other information. Instead, the
Ray court relied only on its “comprehensive reading” of the
easement, which led
to the conclusion that the parties intended a broader
conservation effect than simply protecting the surface
features of the land. In the agreement, reference is made to
protecting nature environmental systems, protecting
conservation values, conserving the quality of water
resources, maintaining and protecting forested areas in order
to protect water resources, conserving biological diversity,
fostering the growth of healthy and unfragmented forest,
184. 2011 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 367 (Pa. County Ct. 2011), aff’d, 68
A.3d 368 (Pa. Super. 2013).
185. Id.
186. Id. at *3–4. The facts in the opinion are unclear whether this was
“traditional” slant drilling or horizontal drilling used in fracking.
187. Id. at *6.
188. Id. at *4.
189. Id. at *5.
190. 2011 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 367, at *5.
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conserving native species, maintaining a continuous canopy
of trees, shrubs, wild flowers and grasses, maintaining,
breeding, sites and migration corridors for birds and wildlife,
and protecting biological integrity, natural resources and
ecosystems.191
E. Going Forward
In both Ray and Stockport II, the courts favored interpreting
conservation easement documents based on their language alone
and did not look to extrinsic evidence. By doing so, the courts were
able to dispose of claims on the pleadings and determine the rights
under the conservation easement, avoiding expensive and long
trials that would be necessary to weigh additional extrinsic facts.
The courts did not explicitly rely on public policies favoring
conservation easements or new energy development in their
decisions, but rather focused on the contractual undertakings of the
parties.
These cases remind drafters of a crucial lesson—to avoid
uncertainty and costly litigation, it is imperative to make the
document fully reflect the intent of the parties in light of current
circumstances and possible events that the future might bring.
More is better in drafting these documents. General, catch-all
language expressing the spirit and purpose of the easement may
provide direction for the parties and a decisionmaker in a future
dispute.
Despite best efforts to provide a solution by drafting, questions
will almost inevitably arise in the future given the perpetual nature
of conservation easements and inexorable change. Although Ray
and Stockport II eschewed extrinsic evidence, not all courts may be
so inclined.192 A court may employ a more liberal attitude towards
extrinsic evidence. Moreover, broadening the inquiry beyond the
words of the document allows the court an opportunity to consider,
explicitly or implicitly, underlying policy considerations, such as
where the balance should be found between conservation and new
energy priorities under current circumstances.193
191. Id. at *5–6.
192. See Orlando Lake Forest Joint Venture v. Lake Forest Master Cmty.,
105 So. 3d 646, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Davista Holdings, LLC v.
Capital Plaza, Inc., 741 S.E.2d 266, 269 (Ga. App. 2013); Taddei v. Vill. Creek
Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 725 S.E.2d 451, 453 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012); Cobb v.
Allen, 460 So. 2d 1261, 1264 (Ala. 1984); Borton v. Forest Hill Country Club,
926 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); 810 Properties v. Jump, 170 P.3d
1209, 1213 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
193. See infra Part IV.C. (discussing covenants and public policy).
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III. CONSENSUAL MODIFICATION OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
TO PERMIT NEW ENERGIES
When an agreement does not allow a party to take a certain
action or the party is unwilling to take the risk of acting where it is
unclear if such behavior is permitted, the parties too often bargain
to amend the original understanding to specifically authorize the
activity. Theoretically, therefore, the fee owner and easement
owner (an NPO or government) should be able to agree to modify
a conservation easement to permit development of some or all of
the new energies. As this section will show, however, there are
legal hurdles to achieving a valid amendment between the fee
owner and conservation easement holder.
A. Modification by Nonprofit Holder
If an NPO holder of a conservation easement seeks to amend a
conservation easement to permit fracking, wind turbines, or solar
devices on the burdened property, there are questions as to whether
the NPO has the power to do so without judicial approval.
Moreover, such a decision will likely create problems with respect
to the easement donor’s tax deduction.
1. Power to Amend
There is currently significant debate on the question of whether
an NPO can simply agree, without more, to amend a conservation
easement. Some argue that all gifts of conservation easements
create charitable trusts.194 This would mean that, under charitable
trust law, changes can only be made if the original purpose of the
easement becomes impossible or impracticable.195 An arguably
rational choice by the NPO to permit new energy development in
exchange for a payment to be used to further the NPO’s other
conservation works (or a swap of land with even higher
conservation values) would not meet the impossibility or
impracticability tests. Thus, the amendment would not be
permitted in the charitable trust context.
Moreover, a proposed change of a charitable trust must be
approved by a court in a cy pres proceeding.196 The state attorney
194. See, e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, In Defense of
Conservation Easements: A Response to The End of Perpetuity, 9 WYO. L. REV.
1 (2009).
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959).
196. Id. § 399 cmts. d, e.
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general has authority to contest the amendment on the grounds that
it does not serve the public interest.197 The attorney general’s
involvement and the requirement for court approval, at a
minimum, would add transaction costs, divert limited NPO funds
from conservation activities to attorney costs, delay the
amendment process, and may prevent the change altogether.
Proponents of the charitable trust classification for
conservation easement gifts maintain that this would better protect
the public interest in conservation lands, ensure that the charitable
deduction is not subverted by allowing a modification benefitting
the donor, and best respect the perpetual nature of conservation
easements.198 Others, however, reject the view that a gift of a
conservation easement automatically creates a charitable trust.199
They maintain that there is a lack of requisite intent to create a
trust; trust law unnecessarily constrains easement holders from
achieving conservation goals through modifications and
alterations; and the general provisions of the IRC sufficiently
ensure that any modifications will serve the public interest because
the nonprofit would otherwise lose its tax-exempt status.200
The disputing sides have marshaled various arguments to
support their positions, yet there is no clear winner.201 For the
purposes of this Article, however, the takeaway is that consensual
modifications by the fee owner and holder of a conservation
easement to permit new energy development may not be
enforceable. Moreover, given this uncertainty, volunteer trustees of
NPOs may hesitate to vote for easement alterations out of a fear of
197. Id. § 391 cmt. a.
198. See McLaughlin & Weeks, supra note 194, at 5, 27-28, 55-56, 70-71,
80-82.
199. See C. Timothy Lindstrom, Conservation Easements, Common Sense
and the Charitable Trust Doctrine, 9 WYO. L. REV. 397, 398 (2009); C. Timothy
Lindstrom, Hicks v. Dowd: The End of Perpetuity?, 8 WYO. L. REV. 25, 83
(2008) [hereinafter Lindstrom, End of Perpetuity]. For an excellent analysis of
this issue, see generally Jessica E. Jay, When Perpetual Is Not Forever: The
Challenge of Changing Conditions, Amendment, and Termination of Perpetual
Conservation Easements, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2012).
200. See Lindstrom, End of Perpetuity, supra note 199, at 45–56, 83.
201. See Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 9, at
508–13. I personally find the charitable trust argument unconvincing unless
there is a clearly expressed, intent to create a trust; otherwise, the gift of the
easement should be treated like any other unrestricted gift to a charitable
organization. Id. at 511–12; Id. n.193. At the same time, I urge the different
sides to move the discussion from one of classification as a trust or not to a
policy-based examination of what should be required for alteration of a
conservation easement, which parties should be involved, and whether judicial
approval is necessary. Id. at 511–12.
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personal liability, thus creating a further drag on flexibility in
easements.202
2. Federal Tax Issues
The IRC and its accompanying Regulations require that a
donor create a conservation easement in perpetuity in order to
qualify for an income tax deduction.203 The one exception remotely
relevant to this Article’s consideration provides that if a court
determines that the accomplishment of a conservation easement’s
purpose becomes impossible or impracticable, the easement may
be released. In such case, the easement holder must be paid a
portion of the consideration, which it must reinvest consistent with
the original easement purposes.204 The regulation does not provide
relief for the hypothetical scenario where a conservation
organization seeks to amend an easement to allow new energy
development simply to allow it to obtain funds to further its
mission or to swap for land with higher conservation values. In this
hypothetical scenario, the original deduction would be at risk.
B. Modification by Governmental Holder
A governmental holder might seek to modify a conservation
easement that it holds. It may, for example, consider altering an
easement to permit installation of wind turbines in order to achieve
clean energy goals.205 In such a situation, the government easement
owner would face the challenges based on charitable trust doctrine
and federal tax issues discussed above. Moreover, governments
must confront additional arguments against alteration of easement
terms.
1. Standing
The ability of governmental conservation easement holders to
agree to modifications is complicated by rules in jurisdictions who
grant standing to citizens to independently enforce the easements.206
202. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1072–73.
203. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2013); 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(1) (2009).
204. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6).
205. See Eileen M. Adams, Residents to Decide on Town Ownership of Lots,
RIVER VALLEY SUN J. (Dec. 1, 2009), http://tinyurl.com/k8ftzxx, archived at
http://perma.cc/ZD23-J87K (reporting on town meeting to discuss rescinding
town’s conservation easement so that six wind towers could be built).
206. Compare McEvoy v. Palumbo, 2011 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 2939
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2011) (denying neighbor standing to enforce portion
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These rules have the advantages of empowering “private attorneys
general” to ensure that conservation goals are advanced. They create
the risk, however, of lessening flexibility in land use and weakening
the democratic process by permitting individual citizens to counter
the decisions of elected and accountable public representatives.
Moreover, some citizens find conservation easements attractive
because they improve the value of their individual, neighboring
properties rather than as a means to provide a general public good.
These owners thus might engage in rent-seeking behavior with
respect to easement decisions.
Government easement holders should be required to follow
procedural requirements, but it seems sensible that they should not
have to experience delay and spend taxpayer funds to defend a
substantive decision against dissenting owners. These owners
should rely on the democratic and elective process for vindication.
Still, the threat of litigation may dissuade a governmental body
from entering into a modification to permit new energy
development on land over which it holds a conservation easement.
2. Specific Statutory Provisions
Three types of state legislation may limit governments from
modifying or terminating conservation easements.207 First, some
legislation authorizing general conservation easements provides
limits on termination, such as requiring the approval of a public
body.208 Other statutes establishing specific types of conservation
easement programs set out precise requirements for release,
termination, and modification of such easements.209 Finally,
general laws controlling the sale of governmental assets can be
viewed as applying to reconveyance of an easement right in whole
of conservation easement barring mowing of land), and Zagrans v. Elk, No.
08CA009472, 2009 Ohio Ct. App. WL 1743203 (Ohio Ct. App. June 22, 2009)
(denying neighbor standing to challenge modification of conservation easement
between park district and owner), with Bjork v. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2008), aff’d, 936 N.E.2d 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2010)
(standing granted to neighbor pursuant to state’s conservation easement statute).
207. See Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements, supra note 9, at
514–18.
208. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31-34 (2014); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 13:8B-5 (2014); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERVATION L. §49-0307 (2011)
(requiring judicial proceeding for termination).
209. See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h):
National Perpetuity Standards for Federally Subsidized Conservation
Easements, Part 2: Comparison to State Law, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. J. 1,
90–92 (2011) (listing statutes).
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(termination) or in part (modification). Such transfers may require
various procedural and substantive regulations.210 These statutory
requirements, therefore, may make it more difficult for a
governmental entity to modify a conservation easement to permit
new energy development.
IV. JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OR TERMINATION OF CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS
There are various doctrines, drawn from the law of covenants,
which a fee owner could rely upon to request the court to modify
or terminate a conservation easement in order to permit the
development of new energies. These include the doctrines of
changed conditions, relative hardship, and prohibition of covenants
violating public policy. These doctrines, however, may not be
helpful to the fee owner except perhaps under the most unusual
circumstances.
A. Changed Conditions
By applying the doctrine of changed conditions, a court will no
longer enforce a covenant if conditions have changed since its
creation so that enforcement can no longer accomplish the original
benefits or purpose of the covenant.211 The changed conditions
theory could theoretically be applied in the conservation easements
setting.212 For example, pollution and development to surrounding
properties might make the accomplishment of an easement to
protect habitat no longer possible. Similarly, climate change may
degrade all conservation values from the subject properties.
Proponents may resist application of the changed conditions theory
in such cases, though, arguing that any open space is valuable and
even more necessary when surrounding lands have become more
developed.
The changed conditions theory provides an answer to deal with
obsolete covenants that no longer serve a significant purpose. It
may prove useful to an owner seeking to develop new energies
where the conservation easement no longer is effective. However,
the changed conditions theory does not provide a mechanism for

210. See IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-11-4 (2013) (procedure); N.Y. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1 (requirement of “adequate consideration”).
211. See KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 92,
453–55.
212. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1077–78.
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courts to balance a public interest in new energy exploration
against a still viable conservation property right.
B. Relative Hardship
Though there are various formulations of the doctrine of
relative hardship, a common articulation is that a court will not
specifically enforce a covenant and will allow only damages if the
harm from the injunction would be disproportionate to its
benefits.213 In applying the test, the courts typically focus on the
positions of the two parties and do not factor in the public’s
interest in whether an injunction should be granted.214 As currently
conceived, the relative hardship rule differs, for example, from the
standard in nuisance cases where courts expressly consider the
public interest in determining whether to grant an injunction or
limit the injured party to money damages.215
Thus, under a traditional relative hardship doctrine, it would be
unlikely that a court would factor in any public interest in new
energy development in determining whether to grant an injunction.
Under a standard relative hardship doctrine where the court
evaluates only the competing positions of the parties, it would be
hard for the fee owner to show that monetary damages would be
sufficient to protect the property right of the conservation easement
holder. The easement holder values its property interest for its
unique ecological values, rather than as an economic asset or a
commodity. Under such circumstances, it would seem appropriate
that a court would grant the traditional injunction remedy to protect
property rights rather than the market-based damages remedy.
The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, however,
suggests that the interest of the public should be expressly
considered by the courts in determining the remedy for breach of a
servitude.216 Under such an approach, a court might find that an
injunction should not be issued, barring a relatively small intrusion
(in terms of acreage, environmental fallout, etc.) on a conservation
easement from a new energy development, but require the violator
to pay compensation.
213. See KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 92, at
462–70.
214. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1078–79.
215. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1970);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 942 (1979).
216. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 8.3(1) cmt. e (2000)
(suggesting that courts should consider costs and benefits to the parties and the
public when determining remedies).
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C. Covenants Violating Public Policy
Courts often state that covenants violating public policy will
not be enforced, though there are few cases where courts actually void
covenants on this theory.217 One noteworthy line of cases involved
courts invalidating subdivision covenants barring group homes,
holding that these restrictions breached a clear statutory and regulatory
policy favoring such institutions.218 Not only do conservation
easements not violate public policy, but rather, they are favored by
public policy, as evidenced by their statutory authorization and public
subsidy.219 Thus, in all but the unusual case, courts should enforce
these property rights.
In a rare instance, however, a court might find that a competing
public policy might necessitate the modification of a conservation
easement. It remains unclear whether the public interest in
development of carbon-based or renewable energies is one of those
situations. It would be a hard case to make: because there are only a
limited number of decisions where courts have invoked public policy
to actually void covenants (and those covenants are not even supported
by strong public policy), it appears that courts would not be disposed
to striking conservation easements, which by contrast are favored by
statute and other public policies.
V. TERMINATION OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS BY EMINENT
DOMAIN
Like other easements220 and covenants,221 conservation
easements should be subject to eminent domain takings.222 Some
conservation easement statutes specifically provide that these
interests are subject to being taken by eminent domain.223 As with
other easements in gross, there would be a special measure of
217. See KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 92, at
397–98.
218. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1080.
219. See supra Part I.A, E.
220. See KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 92, at
268–71.
221. See id. at 473–76.
222. See Harford Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Redevelopment Agency of City
of Bristol, 321 A.2d 469, 471 (Conn. 1975) (requiring compensation for eminent
action invalidating an in gross building restriction, resembling a conservation
easement); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation Easements:
Protecting the Public Interest and Investment in Conservation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1897 (2008).
223. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERVATION. L. § 49-0307(3)(b) (2011); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 121-36(c) (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1010(F) (2014).
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damages for the easement holder: the difference in the value of the
burdened land with, and without the covenant.224 Thus, a partial
taking of an easement could theoretically be made, allowing new
energy development to take place on a small portion of a large
property encumbered by a conservation restriction, with payment
to the conservation easement holder.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Kelo
v. City of New London,225 upholding the use of eminent domain for
economic development under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, generated a backlash among the public,
scholars, and state lawmakers.226 Various voices within the antiKelo camp have maintained that the Fifth Amendment’s “public
use” requirement does not permit economic development takings
or takings that result in the transfer from one private owner to
another.227 Professor Ilya Somin has examined state legislative
responses to Kelo and their attempts to limit economic
development takings and “private to private” takings.228
The question is whether, in light of state reforms post-Kelo,
governmental takings of conservation easements will be upheld.229
Until now, courts have held that condemnation of land for oil and
gas pipes met the public use test, provided that the public has equal
access to purchase the oil and gas.230 Arguably, this would be the
case with an exploration company developing gas supply for sale
through fracking. Similarly, courts held that the taking of land to
build and maintain facilities to generate electricity for sale to the
public is for a public use.231 The taking of a conservation easement
224. See KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 92, at
475.
225. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
226. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 9, at 1082–83.
227. Id.
228. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to
Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2114–38 (2009) (finding many of these efforts
ineffective due to broad blight exceptions, poorly worded legislation, and other
factors).
229. See Ilya Somin & Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Costs of Kelo:
Economic Development Takings and Environmental Protection, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 623, 641–43 (2006) (arguing that economic development can cause
environment damage and land owned by nonprofit environmental groups is not
in the tax base and thus particularly vulnerable to local government seeking to
increase revenue producing property).
230. See generally Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Iowa State Commerce
Commission, 114 N.W.2d 622 (Iowa 1962); Ohio Oil Co. v. Fowler, 100 So. 2d
128 (Miss. 1958); McEwen v. MCR, LLC, 291 P.3d 1253 (Mont. 2012).
231. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Use of Tenn. Valley Auth. v. An Easement and
Right-of-Way Over 1.8 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Maury County, Tenn.,
682 F.Supp. 353 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); Atkinson v. Carolina Power & Light Co.,
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would ultimately involve the transfer of a property right from one
private party (the NPO holder) to another (the fee owner would get
the right back, and then lease it to the energy developer). This
could raise concerns for those objecting to “private to private”
transfers. The fact that the transferee is operating in essence as a
public utility, however, may blunt this argument. Thus, even in an
anti-Kelo environment and legal regime, the taking of a
conservation easement for new energy development might be
upheld.
CONCLUSION
Over recent years, the rapid growth in the use of conservation
easements and the search for new energies—carbon-based and
renewables—have been important developments affecting
American land ownership and policy. Recently, questions have
emerged as to whether and how conservation easements and new
energy development are compatible. The particular issues are
whether fracking, wind turbines, and solar devices can be sited or
operate on land subject to a conservation easement.
This Article shows several key factors influence the answer to
these questions. The agreement of the parties on the issue will
control, but interpreting an ambiguous agreement poses challenges
to the courts and risks to the parties: the IRC provisions concerning
deductibility of conservation easements may have a profound
effect on whether a shift may be made to energy development and
the type of permissible activities; consensual modification of the
landowner and the easement holder to permit energy development
may be complicated by the law of charitable trusts; certain
nonconsensual modification doctrines to permit energy
development might be applied by the courts; and a governmental
taking of the conservation easement remains a possibility although
not as straightforward under state law reforms post-Kelo.
One important lesson is that parties are best served if the
original conservation easement document addresses the issue of
energy development. Hindsight, however, is 20-20. The parties, the
courts, and society are left to address those disputes where the
original parties have not determined the issue consensually.
To better enable current and future generations to resolve
questions that the parties have left open, this Article suggests
several initiatives that may prove helpful. First, judicial
121 S.E.2d 743 (S.C. 1961); Dyer v. Texas Elec. Service Co., 680 S.W.2d 883
(Tex. App. 1984).
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interpretation methods for conservation easements should be
clarified so courts should not presume that the failure to mention a
technology ultimately developed in the future means that the
parties intended that it be prohibited. Rather, the courts in such
situations should determine from the whole document and extrinsic
evidence what the parties would have intended on the issue. At the
same time, though, courts should remember that successor parties
might have a more limited understanding of the original intent.
Consequently, they should only hold successors to what the
successors reasonably could have thought the original parties
intended.
Second, doctrines concerning the amendment and modification
of conservation easements need to be clarified by courts and
legislatures. The current law is unclear as to the extent that
easement holders can make environmentally rational decisions to
modify existing agreements. This potentially frustrates both
conservation goals and other legitimate public policies such as new
energy development. Settling this issue will involve a careful,
thoughtful balancing of conservation values, property rights,
flexibility concerns, the proper role of federal tax law as a driver of
state conservation law, and other policy concerns. Those with
conflicting viewpoints need to engage in open, productive dialogue
to reach a resolution.
Finally, conservation easements are perpetual land interests. As
time passes, it is inevitable that changes in technology, the
environment, societal needs, and the economy will create questions
as to whether a given new energy development is permitted on
conservation easement land. It is important for all the players—the
fee owner, the easement owner, counsel, the community and
broader stakeholders, and decision makers—to recognize that the
dispute invokes large and nuanced public policies and to craft
solutions accordingly.

